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A public pension system should be predictable and reliable.
People need to know what the order of magnitude of their pub-
licly financed old age benefits will be; their private investment
decisions, as well as the psychological well-being, to some extent
depend on this knowledge.
M. Derthick, Policymaking for Social Security.1
The right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision of this Act is
hereby reserved to the Congress.
Social S.ecurity Act of 1935.2
INTRODUCTION
1977 marked a Social Security watershed. The package of
Social Security amendments Congress passed late that year con-
tained the first sweeping benefit reduction in the program's forty
year history. 3 Compared to the conspicuous tax increases simul-
taneously enacted by Congress, this benefit formula revision,
given the code name "decoupling," received little notice. 4  Most
contemporary accounts characterized it simply as a correction of a
technical mistake made by Congress in 1972. 5 In terms of long-
range effect, however, nothing Congress has done to Social Se-
curity in recent years approaches decoupling in importance. The
* Copyright © 1980, Peter W. Martin.
t Dean, Cornell Law School. A.B. 1961, Cornell University; J.D. 1964, Harvard Uni-
versity.
I M. DERTHICK, POLICYMAKING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 423 (1979).
2 Ch. 531, § 1104, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
3 Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 201, 91 Stat. 1509.
1 See, e.g., 33 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC- 1977, at 161 (1978). Its account
of the 1977 legislation, like others, gave greatest prominence to the tax increases that
would total $227 billion over the next 10 years, "the country's largest peacetime tax in-
crease ever." Id.
5 See id. at 162 ("'decoupling' procedures [adopted] to correct a flaw in the existing




amendments not only substantially restructure the Social Security
benefit formula, but appear to signal a political shift raising new
and unsettling questions about the program's future.
Prior to decoupling's success, the passage of any legislative
proposal threatening a widespread negative effect on future Social
Security benefits seemed impossible. For example, President
Ford's 1975 State of the Union Message asked Congress to place a
temporary 5% ceiling on the Social Security cost-of-living adjust-
ment formula, along with Federal salaries and pensions. 6 The
opposition it aroused soon quashed the idea.7  A suggestion in
July, 1977 by Commerce Secretary Juanita Kreps that future So-
cial Security benefit schedules be reduced by a phased-in adjust-
ment of the "normal retirement age" produced such an extraor-
dinary volume of protest that administration leaders jostled each
other in their rush to repudiate her proposal. 8
Only five months later, Congress passed the decoupling pro-
visions, which were predicted to reduce benefits by more than $5
billion between 1978 and 1983, with much larger reductions lying
beyond. 9 Measured against the long-term projected deficit of the
Social Security system-a principal target of the 1977
amendments- decoupling represented roughly as much deficit
reduction on the benefit side, as the tax increases enacted in 1977
could be expected to yield on the contribution side. 1° Why and
how a benefit reduction of such magnitude could be passed by
Congress, without controversy or outcry, is a puzzle worth un-
raveling.
Understanding precisely how the revision will affect future
benefits is an even greater challenge. On the surface, at least, the
1977 amendments appear to have replaced a simple, easily under-
standable formula with a highly complex scheme incomprehensi-
ble to most beneficiaries. Yet the amendments were adopted with
the avowed purpose of bringing greater stability to the benefit
structure. Paradoxically, they allow more reliable prediction of fu-
6 1975 PuB. PAPERS 36, 38 (1977).
7 See 31 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC-1975, at 688 (1976) ("The proposal
went nowhere; not only did Congress not hold hearings, but the idea was so unpopular
politically that a bill embodying the proposal was never introduced.")
8 See 35 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT- 1967, 1874-77 (1977).
9 See H.R. REP. No. 702, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 7, reprinted in [19771 U.S. CODE




ture benefits, but their complexity also makes prediction more
difficult for most potential beneficiaries.
This Article deals with two related questions: (1) how and
why the 1977 decoupling amendments were passed, and (2) what
effect they are likely to have on future benefits. Since others have
written about the policy and politics of decoupling," the distinc-
tive approach of this study warrants explanation. Existing litera-
ture on decoupling focuses primarily on the choices that con-
fronted public decisionmakers immediately prior to and during
1977. The legal perspective of this study leads to quite a different
emphasis. Here decoupling is viewed as a legal or legislative
phenomenon-the most intricate and complete in a long series of
legislative devices designed to assure that Social Security remains
"up-to-date." The Article also explores the consequences of de-
coupling on individual retirement planning, focusing on the pre-
dictability and reliability of future Social Security benefits-both
before and after decoupling-from the perspective of prospective
recipients attempting to take account of future benefits. This re-
quires a look beyond the current provisions of the law, to the
likelihood and probable patterns of future revisions.
While this study may hold interest for Social Security
specialists and students of public policy, it is directed primarily to
practicing lawyers and legal scholars. Lawyers play a central role
in assisting, guiding, and shaping their clients' long-range finan-
cial plans. Too many perform this function largely ignorant about
Social Security. The program is complicated, and its benefits may
not loom large alongside the other income and holdings of a
wealthy individual. Yet, $8,000 a year or more of inflation-proof,
tax-free family income demands some attention. 12  The 1977
decoupling amendments, combined with the recent spread of pub-
lic concern about the stability of the Social Security program,
13
11 On the politics of decoupling, see the excellent account in M. DERTHICK, supra note
1, at 387-408 (1979). For useful discussions of the need for decoupling and the principal
options available, see CONSULTANT PANEL ON SOCIAL SECURITY TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RE-
SEARCH SERVICE, REPORT, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS. (Joint Comm. Print 1976); FINANCING SOCIAL
SECURITY 1-169 (C. Campbell ed. 1979); R. KAPLAN, INDEXING SOCIAL SECURITY: ANALYSIS OF
THE ISSUES (1977); A. MUNNELL, THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 25-61, 143-46 (1977).
12 See Table 5, infra. The monthly benefit for a high-earnings worker is approximately
$500 per month, depending on the age at which benefit payments begin. That totals
$6,000 a year; an eligible spouse adds $3,000 or more.
13 A recent opinion survey reports that eighty percent of the U.S. adult population
have "less than full confidence" in the Social Security System; forty percent, primarily
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have increased the need for informed lawyer-counseling on the
relative size and value of clients' future Social Security benefits.
This Article attempts to respond to that need. It begins by laying
the foundation for a general understanding of how the restruc-
tured benefit formula works, noting how decoupling differs from
prior law and legislative techniques for responding to economic
change. It goes on to illustrate specifically how a lawyer can assist
a client to estimate future benefits.
1
SOCIAL SECURITY ADJUSTMENTS TO CHANGING PRICES
AND WAGES PRIOR TO 1977
A. The Principle of Actuarial Soundness
From its inception, the Social Security program has incorpo-
rated a forward-looking perspective. The original legislation com-
bined two features that required attention to the future operation
of the program despite distant shifts in economic conditions: (1) a
financial base for present and future periods resting on new taxes
levied against covered employees' annual earnings up to a fixed
ceiling, and (2) a benefit formula, applicable to both individuals
approaching retirement and to those still many years away, that
tied the level of monthly payments to the worker's taxed wages
over a lengthy period. 14
Enacted in 1935, the legislation provided that monthly re-
tirement benefits would not be paid until 1942.15 It specified the
monthly benefits the first beneficiaries would receive over the bal-
ance of their lives: More ambitious still, the Act specified the taxes
to be paid by young workers over a period of approximately forty
years and the monthly benefits they would receive upon retire-
ment. The drafters and later revisers sought to frame a law that
would operate sensibly over a very long stretch. Perhaps naively,
they contemplated charts showing how the 1935 Act would per-
form in 1980 and beyond.
16
young workers, have "hardly any confidence at all." ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SE-
CURITY, SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING AND BENEFITS 27 (1979), quoting Louis HARRIS AND
ASSOCIATES, 1979 STUDY OF AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT 94
(1979).
14 See Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, §§ 201-210, 49 Stat. 620.
15 See SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, SOCIAL SECURITY IN AMERICA 222-24 (1937).
16 See A. ALTMEYER, THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF SOCIAL SECURITY 26 (1966).
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The insurance concept with which the program was draped
produced the phrase by which this notion of long-term reason-
ableness was most often expressed. From the start, the drafters
said that Social Security should be "actuarially sound."1 7  Experts
advised Congress that the 1935 program met this test. 18  Four
years later, in 1939, Congress enacted major Social Security revi-
sions. 19 Again, it sought to enact an actuarially sound system that
would function properly over a long period. Congress also added
a device to provide warning of developing unsoundness. Drafters
of the 1935 Act had avoided linking the program's tax and ben-
efit provisions for constitutional reasons.2" In 1937, however, the
Supreme Court removed those concerns. 21  Congress was free to
express a direct connection between taxes and benefits. The 1939
amendments, thus, employed insurance terminology throughout,
established the Social Security "trust fund" as an earmarking
method, created a Board of Trustees comprised of the Chairman
of the Social Security Board, the Secretary of the Treasury and
the Secretary of Labor, and called upon that body to report an-
nually to Congress on the operation and status of the fund.2 2
Congress intended that the mandatory trustees' report not be
simply a retrospective accounting. The Act called for it to cover
both the "expected operation and status [of the trust fund] during
the next ensuing five fiscal years" and its "actuarial status."
2 3
"T See SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, supra note 15; E. WITTE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 147-51 (1962). For an account of the enduring tension between actu-
arial principles appropriate to private insurance and the demands of Social Security, see M.
DERTHICK, supra note 1, at 170-82.
18 The 1935 Act provided that appropriations to the Old-Age Reserve Account should
be "determined on a reserve basis in accordance with accepted actuarial principles, and
based upon such tables of mortality as the Secretary of the Treasury shall from time to time
adopt .... " It also required the Secretary to report annually on the. "actuarial status" of
the account. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, § 201(a), 49 Stat. 620.
19 Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 201, 53 Stat. 1360. See Martin,
Public Assurance of an Adequate Minimum Income in Old Age: The Erratic Partnership Between
Social Insurance and Public Assistance, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 437, 460-61 (1979).
20 At the time, the drafters believed that they could avoid tenth amendment problems
by isolating the tax and benefit provisions of the Act. They hoped that the law would be
justified as a valid exercise of Congress' taxing power. See E. WITTE, supra note 17, at
146-47.
21 See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 645 (1937) (validating the 1935 Act in spite of
possible connection between tax and benefits). After the Court's decision, the Social Se-
curity Board began to refer to the program as "old-age insurance," terminology it had
previously avoided. See Wollenberg, Vested Rights in Social-Security Benefits, 37 OREGON L.
REV. 299, 307 n.25 (1958).
22 Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 201, 53 Stat. 1360.
23 Id. § 201(b).
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Despite its concern with the fund's future financial health,
Congress failed to consider the likely impact of time and
economic change on the adequacy of the benefits promised by the
statutory formula. Instead, Congress focused almost entirely on
the internal relationships of the program-the long-term balance
between projected revenues and benefits.
Actuarial soundness did not, particularly in the early years,
hold the same meaning for all. Views differed sharply over
whether the tax rates written into the law should provide the rev-
enue necessary to pay all future benefits, or only benefits' for a
shorter future period, leaving the problem of distant projected
deficits to later Congresses. The first and more extreme view was,
at President Roosevelt's insistence, incorporated in the 1935 legis-
lation. 24
The 1939 amendments increased benefit payments for those
nearing retirement, and delayed a payroll tax increase that the
1935 Act had scheduled for 1940. The changes reflected a looser
view of balance and growing misgivings about tax and benefit
schedules that would build up large reserve funds. 5 In 1939,
the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance
Committee adopted Treasury Secretary Morgenthau's view that
the tax rates and benefit schedules should not be set to yield an
''eventual reserve amounting to ... more than three times the
highest prospective annual benefits in the ensuing 5 years."26 The
committees were persuaded that the revised system was financially
sound, but acknowledged the possibility that unpredicted changes
might require additional sources of funding. 
27
24 The original proposal by the Committee on Economic Security suggested lower
payroll taxes and contemplated substantial general revenue financing beginning in 1965.
President Roosevelt insisted that the proposed system should balance without use of gen-
eral revenues. The 1935 Act reflected this view. It contained a schedule of tax rates pro-
jected to yield a very large reserve. See E. WITTE, supra note 17, at 74, 147-51.
This potential reserve was one of the most controversial features of the legislation. See
Crowley, Financing the Social Security Program-Then and Now, in SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POL-
ICY OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 93d, CONG., 2d SEss., STUDIES IN PUBLIC WELFARE: PAPER
No. 18, IssUES IN FINANCING RETIREMENT INCOME 24-26 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter
cited as RETIREMENT INCOME STUDY].
25 See RETIREMENT INCOME STUDY, supra note 24, at 26-29. To assure that heavy future
benefit demands could be met, the 1935 legislation had set tax rates for the 1940's esti-
mated to yield a large reserve. See note 24 supra.
26 RETIREMENT INCOME STUDY, supra note 24, at 28. See Hearings Relative to the Social
Security Amendments of 1939 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.
2113 (1939).
2 The Senate Finance Committee stated:
Unforeseen contingencies may, however, change the entire operation of
the plan. It is important, therefore, that Congress be kept fully informed of the
1980] 753
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
In summary, two opposing concerns about the future opera-
tion of the new Social Security system marked the Act, as
amended in 1939: a concern that the payroll tax might not gener-
ate enough revenue to cover benefits promised by the statute, and
conversely, a concern that revenues might exceed benefits by such
a large measure that an enormous reserve fund would develop.
The Act therefore directed the Board of Trustees to:
Report immediately to the Congress whenever [it] is of the
opinion that during the ensuing five fiscal years the Trust Fund
will exceed three times the highest annual expenditures antici-
pated during that five-fiscal-year period, and whenever [it] is of
the opinion that the amount of the Trust Fund is unduly
small. 28
B. Congress' Reserved Power to Amend
Although the 1939 amendments raised benefits generally,
they did not increase payments for all classes of future ben-
eficiaries. The revised schedule provided for smaller monthly
payments for workers with many working years before retirement,
unless household family members were eligible for the newly-
created dependents and survivors benefits.2 9 Moreover, the
amendments eliminated the lump sum return of contribution
which the 1935 Act had furnished workers who paid the social
security tax but failed to qualify for monthly benefits. 30  Al-
together, the changes enhanced the value of benefits promised by
the 1935 Act for most but not all contributors.
This restructuring would have been impossible if the 1935
Act had unconditionally guaranteed benefits. Quite clearly, how-
ever, it did not. Section 1104 of the Act provided: "The right to
alter, amend, or repeal any provision of this Act is hereby re-
served to the Congress." 31  This section ultimately protected the
probable future obligations being incurred under the insurance plan.... Each
generation may then meet the situation before it in such manner that it deems
best.
If future annual pay-roll tax collections plus available interest are insuffi-
cient to meet future annual benefits it will be necessary, in order to pay the
promised benefits, to increase the pay-roll tax or provide for the deficiency out
of other general taxes, or do both.
S. REp, No. 734, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1939) (accompanying H.R. 6635).
28 Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 201(b)(3), 53 Stat. 1360.
29 See Martin, supra note 19, at 460-61.
30 See Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 9 0 2 (g), 53 Stat. 1360.
31 Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, § 1104, 49 Stat. 620.
754 [Vol. 65:748
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program from an uncertain future. Even the best actuarial projec-
tions were understood to be guesses. Therefore, flexibility was es-
sential. 32
In the years after 1935, Congress has repeatedly exercised
this reserved flexibility; indeed, section 1104 is one of the few
provisions of the Social Security Act that Congress has not "al-
tered, amended, or repealed." Like the 1939 amendments, most
revisions of the formula have increased benefits. 33  But section
1104 has also permitted Congress to reduce or eliminate expected
benefits.3 4 Some of those revisions have gone so far as to reduce
the value of monthly payments to individuals already receiving
them. a
C. Unprincipled Benefit Revision
The Board of Trustees soon had occasion to report a reserve
fund exceeding the "three times annual expenditures" benchmark
set in 1939. Social Security's 1% payroll tax, levied on the first
$3,000 of annual earnings against both employer and employee,
generated far greater revenues during the 1940's than Congress
had anticipated. World War II drove both employment and earn-
ings levels substantially above. pre-war figures. Growth in the
number of covered workers produced an immediate gain in in-
-come while the inevitable rise in the number of beneficiaries lay
off in the distant future.36 Climbing wage levels also produced a
direct effect on the program's income. Individual earnings subject
to the payroll tax rose sharply. 3 Although higher covered wages
meant that the system had to pay out higher benefits, those ben-
32 The Supreme Court wrote in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960):
[The Social Security] program was designed to function into the indefinite fu-
ture, and its specific provisions rest on predictions as to expected economic
conditions which must inevitably prove less than wholly accurate, and on judg-
ments and preferences as to the proper allocation of the Nation's resources
which evolving economic and social conditions will of necessity in some degree
modify.
To engraft upon the Social Security system a.concept of "accrued property
rights" would deprive it of the flexibility and boldness in adjustment to ever-
changing conditions which it demands.
Id. at 610.
33 See text accompanying notes 51-67 infra.
"' See generally Wollenberg, supra note 21.
3- See Bernstein v. Ribicoff, 299 F.2d 248 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 887 (1962).
36 See BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE TRUST
FUND, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 694, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1942).
37 See Soc. SEC. BULL.-ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1975, Table 36, at 69.
19801 755
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
efits would be paid in a future period. In addition, under the
1939 formula, growth in wages above the lowest levels produced
only a minimal effect on benefits. 38
These developments posed no threat to actuarial soundness;
instead, they increased the program's fiscal strength. Indeed,
Congress and the President disagreed over whether these war-
time economic conditions might lead to the reverse problem-a
great imbalance between program revenues and expenditures
creating an excessively large reserve fund. 39  As early as 1941,
the Board of Trustees reported to Congress that the reserves
would exceed three times annual expenditures within five
years . 4' Neither the Trustees nor the administration advocated
an adjustment in tax or benefits, 41 but Congress did. The 1939
amendments had scheduled a contribution rate increase for 1943.
Despite President Roosevelt's opposition, Congress attached a
rider to the Revenue Act of 1942 that postponed this increase
until January 1, 1944.42
Actuarial principles furnished no guide when taxes and ben-
efits were judged to be out of balance because of price, wage and
employment trends of the war years. In order to adjust the ba-
lance, Congress might have increased benefits, or allowed the re-
serve to grow. Instead, Congress repeatedly chose to cut taxes
against the wishes of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. After
1942, Congress postponed the payroll tax increase six more times,
holding the rate at 1% until 1950. 4 3  It enacted the 1944 post-
ponement over a presidential veto. 44  In response to the admin-
istration's concern with actuarial soundness, however, Congress
accompanied the 1944 postponement with a provision authorizing
38 See Martin, supra note 19, at 461-62.
'9 See RETIREMENT INCOME STUDY, supra note 24, at 29.
40 See BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE TRUST
FUND, supra note 36, at 9.
The board of trustees, in its first annual report to the Congress, indicated
that in the 5 fiscal years, 1941 to 1945, the trust fund would apparently exceed
three times the highest annual expenditures anticipated during the 5-fiscal-year
period. A similar relationship is now anticipated for the ensuing 5 fiscal years
(1942 through 1946). This condition is again reported to the Congress in ac-
cordance with section 201 (b) (3) of the Social Security Act.
41 See id. The administration argued that the "three times rule" was not intended to
apply to the early years of the system. It also asserted that the higher tax rates written into
the law should be allowed to take effect to help finance the war effort and hold down
inflation. See RETIREMENT INCOME STUDY, supra note 24, at 29.
42 See A. ALTMEYER, supra note 16, at 137-38.
43 See id. at 149-60.
44 See id. at 149.
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appropriation from general revenue to the trust fund of "such
additional sums as may be required to finance the benefits and
payments under this title."4 5  Despite these delays, the system
generated a substantial reserve, totaling 23.4 times annual expen-
ditures in 1945, and 13.4 times annual expenditures in 1950.4
Standards or reference points outside the Act were needed to
understand the effect these dramatic economic changes were hav-
ing on the benefit scheme. In the immediate post-war years, Pres-
ident Truman emphasized wage increases and the higher cost of
living when he called on Congress to increase Social Security ben-
efits.47 An Advisory Council on Social Security appointed by the
Senate Finance Committee presented similar arguments in its
1948 report calling for extension of Social Security coverage to
additional 'workers and dramatic benefit increases. The Council.
stressed the inadequacy of benefits in relation to the buying
power of past benefits and associated earnings levels, the current
public assistance standards, and the cost of the basic necessities of
life.48 It pointed out that in 1939, the $3,000 statutory limitation
" See Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, § 902, 58 Stat. 21 (1944).
46 See Korns, The Future of Social Security, in RETIREMENT INCOME STUDY, supra note 24,
at 1, 4. Estimates of the reserve fund in 1939 projected that the fund would reach $7-8
billion by the end of 1955. Notwithstanding the tax rate freeze during the forties, the fund
was nearly $12.9 billion by the end of June 1950. See RETIREMENT INCOME STUDY, supra
note 24, at 29.
47 President Truman's May 24, 1948 Special Message to Congress on Social Security
urged more adequate benefits on the following grounds:
The benefits being paid under old-age and survivors insurance are seri-
ously inadequate. They were adjusted last in 1939. Even then, the benefits in
most cases replaced only a small part of the income that the worker or his
survivors had lost because of his retirement or death. Earnings and the cost of
living have risen sharply since that time and cannot be expected to return to
prewar levels. Consequently, further adjustments in benefit rates are impera-
tive.
People whose sole income is from social security payments have just about
reached the breaking point....
The present average payment for a retired worker is only about $25 a
month, and is substantially less for dependents and survivors. If the insurance
system is to prevent dependency upon public and private charity this amount is
obviously far too low. I recommend that the Congress increase benefits by at
least 50 per cent.
1948 PUB. PAPERS 272-73 (1964).
4' See SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY LEGIS-
LATION: THE REPORTS OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, S. Doc. No. 208,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10, 35 (1949) [hereinafter cited as 1948 ADVISORY COUNCIL RE-
PORT]. The Advisory Council was appointed September 17, 1947, as a concession by the
Senate Finance Committee responding to the administration's displeasure with the re-
peated tax increase postponements. See ALTMEYER, supra note 16, at 160; M. DERTHICK,
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on annual wages taxed and counted for Social Security purposes
had covered total earnings for nearly 97 percent of those subject
to the tax, but that the subsequent rise in wage levels was exclud-
ing growing amounts of the earnings of a significant proportion
of covered workers.49 The Council did not recommend a simple
up-dating of the 1939 provisions measured against wage or price in-
creases, but placed the direction and size of its proposed adjust-
ments in the context of such comparisons with 1939.
The 1948 Advisory Council's report also expressed a general
view on benefit adequacy during periods of economic change that
indicated a need for repeated revisions of tax and benefit
schedules: "A social insurance program must be adjusted periodi-
cally to basic economic changes. In a dynamic economy, provisions
which were appropriate at the time they became effective inevita-
bly become outmoded.
' 50
The Democratic Congress elected in 1948 eventually restruc-
tured Social Security along the lines recommended by the Presi-
dent and the 1948 Advisory Council. 51 The Social Security Act
Amendments of 1950 both expanded the program's coverage and
boosted benefits through a total revision of the benefit for-
mula.5 2  Both existing beneficiaries and future retirees were af-
fected.
53
supra note 1, at 91-92. Its final report was dated December 1948, but the OASI portions
were issued separately on April 20, 1948. See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY,
OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE: A REPORT TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, S.
Doc. No. 149, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
49 1948 ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 48, at 32. "In 1945 about 14 percent of
all covered workers had wages exceeding $3,000 .... " Id.
51 Id. at 31-32. The report stated:
For millions of persons the social security system represents a guaranty of
future security. If that guaranty is to be valid and meaningful, the purchasing
power of benefits must not be destroyed by large increases in price levels. A
special obligation rests on the Government and all groups in the community
with an interest in the social-insurance system and the security it offers to make
sure that the monetary policies, price policies, and wage policies contribute to
the objective of preventing such a large rise in the price level. If the people of
the United States are unable to prevent steep increases in price levels, benefits
will have to be readjusted to preserve their pijrchasing power for unless the
purchasing power of the benefits is preserved, the security guaranteed by the
social-insurance plan will be illusory.
Id. at 13-14.
"' See Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, 64 Stat. 477; A. ALTMEYER,
supra note 16, at 163, 169-87.




The 1950 amendments reemphasized the principle of actuar-
ial soundness by repealing the 1944 authorization for appropria-
tions from general revenue. " The Finance Committee report on
the amendments took the position that the program "should
[operate] on a completely self-supporting basis."" Actuarial bal-
ance did not, however, pose an obstacle to benefit improvement.
In fact, Congress was able to increase benefits by more than 75%
without dramatically raising the tax. 56 The 1950 amendments
boosted the tax base-the ceiling on taxable wages-to $3,600
beginning in 1951 and increased tax rates to 1 1/2% for
employees and employers for 1950-53, 2% for 1954-59 (prior to
the amendments, that increase was scheduled for 1952), 2 1/2%
for 1960-64, 3% for 1965-69 and 3 1/4% thereafter (higher rates
than previously set in the law). 57  Actuarial projections estimated
these tax rates would adequately cover future benefits payable
under the revised schedule.
58
From 1950 through 1972, Congress clung to the view that
the Social Security program should be self-supporting. Each year
the Board of Trustees of the Trust Fund reported on the actuar-
ial soundness of the program. As payroll tax receipts rose with
individual earnings, Congress responded from time to time with
benefit increases. Each such change maintained the discipline of
actuarial balance. 59 Thus, Congress frequently employed tax rate
54 Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, § 109(a)(3), 64 Stat. 477.
55 S. REP. No. 1669, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 33, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3287, 3322:
Your committee has very carefully considered the problems of cost in determin-
ing the benefit provisions recommended. Also your committee is of the belief
that the old-age and survivors insurance program should be on a completely
self-supporting basis. Accordingly, the committee-approved bill, just as the
House-approved bill, eliminates the provision added in 1943 authorizing ap-
propriations to the program from general revenues. At the same time, your
committee has recommended a tax schedule which it believes will make the
system self-supporting as nearly as can be foreseen under present cir-
cumstances.
Id.
56 See notes 60-62 and accompanying text infra.
'7 Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, §§ 201(a), 203(a), 64 Stat. 477.
58 See S. REP. No. 1669, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 33-52, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3287, 3322-43.
59 Actuarial balance calculations accompanied all important Social Security amend-
ments during this period. Congress consistently declared fiscal balance to be a constraining
7591980]
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adjustments and tax base increases to achieve balance. Inevitably,
the Act specified substantially larger future tax rates, which were
at least partially rolled back as the future drew near.
Although the 1950 benefit increases were achieved through a
complete restructuring of the benefit formula,6 ° Congress made
subsequent adjustments within the framework it established in
1950. That framework based benefits on average covered wages
between 1950 and the year of entitlement. Essentially the formula
had two parts-a foi-mula for computing the Average Monthly
Wage (AMW),6 1 and a set of multipliers that converted the AMW
into a monthly benefit amount payable to a worker retiring at age
sixty-five. The statute termed this basic benefit "primary insur-
ance amount" (PIA).6 2 The multipliers varied according to the
size of the worker's average wage so that individuals with low
AMWs received a greater relative benefit than those with high
AMWs. The 1950 formula had two broad AMW brackets with as-
sociated multipliers and a graduated lower bracket bottomed on a
minimum PIA. (See Table 1.)
principle. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1856, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3608, 3644:
The Congress has always carefully considered the cost aspects of the old-
age, survivors, and disability insurance system when amendments to the pro-
gram have been made. In connection with the 1950 amendments, the Congress
was of the belief that the program should be completely self-supporting from
the contributions of covered individuals and employers. Accordingly, in that
legislation, the provision permitting appropriations to the system from general
revenues of the Treasury was repealed. This policy has been continued in sub-
sequent amendments. Thus, the Congress has always very strongly believed that
the tax schedule in the law should make the system self-supporting as nearly as
can be foreseen and, therefore, actuarially sound.
The reserve fund bench mark of three times annual expenditures established in 1939
was formally abandoned in 1960. See 1960 Social Security Amendments, Pub. L. No. 86-
778, § 701, 74 Stat. 924. By then the reserve no longer exceeded that standard and the
1959 Advisory Council recommended the deletion: "We do not believe that the trust funds
should be held to any arbitrary relationship to expected annual expenditures, and we rec-
ommend that the provision be repealed." BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE
AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE TRUST FUND AND THE FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST
FUND, 19TH ANNUAL REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 181, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 68, app. iv (1959).
" See Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, § 104, 64 Stat. 477.
6' The statutory term was always "Average Monthly Wage," but Social Security litera-
ture, including agency publications, has also used the term "Average Monthly Earnings."
See, e.g., A. MUNNELL, supra note 11, at 27; J. PECHMAN, H. AARON, & M. TAUSSIG, SOCIAL
SECURITY: PERSPECTIVES FOR REFORM 79 (1968); Soc. SEC. BULL.-ANNUAL STATISTICAL
SUPPLEMENT, 1975, at 7.
62 Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, § 104, 64 Stat. 477.
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TABLE 1
Benefit Formula Established By 1950 Amendments
AMW FORMULA PIA
$ 30 or less $20 (minimum PIA)
31 21









180 PIA = $50 plus 62
220 15% (AMW - $100) 68
260 74
300 80
Source: Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-734, ch. 809, § 104, 64
Stat. 477.
Later amendments modified the benefit base by eliminating a
number of low-income years from the AMW calculation 63 and
providing for optional receipt of benefits prior to the program's
original age sixty-five threshold, with a consequent reduction in
benefit amount. 64 The latter was not accomplished by employing
a different PIA formula, but rather by stipulating that those re-
ceiving benefits before age sixty-five would receive only a
percentage of their full PIA. 65 However, the most dramatic
changes in the formula during the years after 1950 took the form
of multiplier changes designed to respond to wage and price in-
creases. Prior to 1972, the process was totally ad hoc. Approxi-
mately once every two or three years, generally shortly before
elections, Congress raised benefits by changing the multiplier,
matching and sometimes surpassing increases in living costs. 66
While the principal purpose of the adjustments appeared to be to
"3 See Soc. SEC. BULL.-ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1975, at 18.
64 Id. at 20-22.
65 See 42 U.S.C. § 402(q)(1) (1976).
66 See Soc. SEC. BULL.-ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1975, at 18-19.
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prevent devaluation of the otherwise fixed dollar incomes of So-
cial Security pensioners, the same adjusted schedule applied in
each case to future retirees.6"
During the same period, Congress also occasionally amended
the maximum amount of taxable and countable wages. 68  This
produced corresponding increases in the maximum attainable
AMW. At first, the amendments dealt with the wider spread of
possible AMWs by expanding the two basic brackets of the benefit
formula. Until 1965, the formula contained only two brackets.
Thereafter, Congress left the lower AMW brackets undisturbed
and responded to each instance of higher potential AMWs by
adding a new bracket with a different and, with one exception,
lower multiplier. Under the 1967 amendments, the number of
brackets increased to four. By 1972 there were six. (See Table 2.)
At no point during this period did the legislation itself
guarantee that these adjustments would continue. As it up-dated
the 1950 formula from time to time, Congress reiterated the view
of the 1948 Advisory Council that the purposes of Social Security
would be served only if the benefits being paid are adjusted to
changes in economic conditions. 69 Committee reports invariably
justified benefit increases by citing wage and price rises since
prior adjustments. But Congress did not attempt in any specific
way to relate such changes to the proposed formula revision.
Wage and price changes merely furnished the justification for the
direction and relative size of benefit increases. 70 Occasionally
Congress saw itself not only up-dating Social Security benefits in
light of inflation, but providing, in an absolute sense, "some im-
provement in the adequacy of benefits." 7i
Although Congress retained full control over Social Security
adjustments, pressure for both up-dating and absolute increases
came from the Social Security Administration, organized labor,
other less influential interest groups and periodically-appointed
V Typically the amendment would set forth a new benefit table with one column con-
verting PIAs established under prior law into the new higher amounts, and a second col-
umn applying to subsequently qualifying beneficiaries, that. contained the new Average
Monthly Wage-PIA relationship. See, e.g., Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-97, § 301, 79 Stat. 286.
61 See Soc. SEC. BULL.-ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1975, at 32.
69 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1987, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3710, 3710-12.
"' See, e.g., S. REP. No. 2388, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4218, 4220.













50% of first $100 plus
15% of next $200
1952 Greater of 55% of first $100 plus
12 1/2% or $5 15% of next $200
1954 Approx. 13% 55% of first $110 plus






58.85% of first $110 plus
21.40% of next $290
62.97% of first $110 plus
22.90% of next $290 plus
21.40% of next $150
71.16% of first $110 plus
25.88% of next $290 plus
24.18% of next $150 plus
28.43% of next $100
1969 Approx. 15% 81.83% of first $110 plus
29.76% of next $290 plus
27.81% of next $150 plus
32.69% of next $100
1971 10% 90.01% of first $110 plus
32.74% of next $290 plus
30.59% of next $150 plus
35.96% of next $100 plus
20% of next $100
1972 20% 108.01% of first $110 plus
39.29% of next $290 plus
36.71% of next $150 plus
43.15% of next $100 plus
24% of next $100 plus
20% of next $250
Source: Soc. SEC. BULL.-ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1975, at 18-19.
advisory councils. The 1956 amendments established advisory
councils as a formal part of the program's policy-making struc-
ture, providing that such bodies should be appointed in advance
of all future tax increases. 72 The 1956 provisions merely charged
the councils with the study of financing issues; but a 1960
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amendment expanded their purview to include possible exten-
sions of coverage and improvements in benefit adequacy. 73  The
statutory councils recommended specific legislative techniques for
adjusting the system to changing economic conditions.
74
This process of up-dating through amendment posed a seri-
ous dilemma for those charged with plotting the program's actu-
arial soundness. Should their calculations reflect present benefits
and taxes, or attempt to predict the future Congressional changes
that were inevitable given foreseeable increases in wages and
prices? The program actuaries and Board of Trustees adopted
the former approach during the forties and applied it long after it
became evident that wage and price increases would not soon
cease and that Congress would up-date benefits periodically. The
approach assumed no change in the statutory benefit and tax
schedules and matched that assumption with an equally unrealistic
one of level wages. 75  A 1947 Trustees' report, which employed
this method of calculating balance, noted that wages had been in-
creasing and explained that if the trend continued, contributions
would rise more steeply than benefits. 7 6  In sum, program ac-
tuaries based their projections on unrealistic assumptions of static
wages and benefit rates. They nevertheless began to recognize the
impact of wage growth and benefit revision, but believed that the
effect of the former would sufficiently finance the latter. 77
13 See Social Security Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-778, § 704(b), 74 Stat. 924.
74 See, e.g., ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, THE STATUS OF THE SOCIAL SE-
CURITY PROGRAM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ITS IMPROVEMENT 4, 54-60 (1965). On the
important role of the advisory councils, see M. DERTHICK, supra note 1, at 89-109.
75 The assumption of a static law was often justified by Social Security Administration
actuaries on the ground that it would be presumptuous for them to assume specific Con-
gressional changes. See RETIREMENT INCOME STUDY, supra note 24, at 95.
See S. Doc. No. 18, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1947). The Council continued:
With such assumptions, the rise in wages would seem to offer significant finan-
cial help in the financing of benefits because pay-roll contributions at a fixed
percentage rate would increase steadily relative to benefit disbursements; but
benefits paid to beneficiaries would steadily diminish in relation to current
wage levels. In such a case, it is likely that the present formula would not be
maintained, but rather revisions would be adopted which would make average
benefits at least as adequate relative to the then existing average wage level as
average benefits under the present formula were in relation to the 1939 wage
level.
Id. at 30.
17 See, e.g., ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, THE STATUS OF THE SOCIAL SE-
CURITY PROGRAM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ITS IMPROVEMENT 16 (1965):
The Council believes that making the estimates on a level-wage assumption al-
lows for a desirable margin of safety and recommends that the practice be con-
tinued in making the long-range estimates.
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In the early sixties, the Board of Trustees added a new ac-
tuarial projection to their annual report: "medium-range cost
estimates for the next 15 to 20 years ... [taking] into account
possible variations in economic factors, such as earnings and em-
ployment levels, as well as in demographic developments.
78
Although these estimates reflected predicted wage growth, ini-
tially they did not reflect benefit changes:
The medium-range estimates, like the short-range and
long-range estimates, assume no future changes in the law.
However, over the period covered by the estimates, many
changes will undoubtedly be made. In particular, if earnings
levels rise, changes will almost certainly be made in benefit
levels. The extent and timing of whatever changes are made in
the law are, of course, unpredictable. 79
Before long, the Board of Trustees began constructing two
medium-range projections-one assuming no change in the law
and the second assuming "that the law is frequently amended to
keep the system fully up to date." 
80
By the late sixties, the pattern of repeated Congressional re-
visions of the benefit and tax provisions had become fairly clear to
program administrators and other experts. By then, it also
seemed obvious that the steady growth in wages furnished a reli-
able source of revenue from which to finance benefit improve-
ments.8 1  The 1971 Advisory Council recommended that Con-
78 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE TRUST
FUND AND THE FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUND, 23D ANNUAL REPORT, H.R.
Doc. No. 80, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-33 (1963).
7 Id. at 33.
80 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE TRUST
FUND AND THE FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUND, 25TH ANNUAL REPORT, H.R.
Doc. No. 100, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1965).
RI In 1967, Social Security Commissioner Robert M. Ball wrote:
There is some leeway for improvement in [benefits in] the future without a
Government contribution [from general revenues] and without increasing the
contribution rate.... [I]f the maximum earnings base is increased somewhat
from time to time (it does not have to be increased proportionately to increases
in earnings levels for this purpose), contribution rates in present law will pro-
duce sufficient income to considerably more than keep benefits adjusted to fu-
ture increases in prices.
SUBCOMMITrEE ON FISCAL POLICY OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 90TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
OLD AGE INCOME ASSURANCE 56 (Comm. Print 1967).
Annual reports of the Board of Trustees during the late sixties and early seventies
contained the following warning:.
It is important to note that these estimates are made on the assumption that
earnings will remain at about the level prevailing in [the previous year]. If earn-
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gress incorporate this financing scheme into the Social Security
Act. It proposed an amendment to provide for automatic benefit
increases tied to increases in the Consumer Price Index and for
automatic wage base increases based on increases in the average
covered wage. In effect, the proposal was an automatic modifica-
tion mechanism following the pattern of adjustment Congress had
practiced in crude form since 1950.82
The Council also urged that the method of performing actu-
arial balance be changed to reflect the availability of additional
revenue from future wage increases. 83 The proposed automatic
adjustment feature would remove any ground for assuming level
benefits or wages and compel the use of projected wages and ben-
efits. 84  In 1972, Congress adopted the Council's automatic ad-
justment recommendation and, relying on the revised actuarial
principles, enacted an immediate 20% across-the-board increase. 85
ings levels rise, as they have in the past, the benefits and the taxable earnings
base under the program will undoubtedly be modified. In fact, if all other as-
sumed cost factors are closely followed by the experience, then increasing wage
levels will automatically generate positive actuarial balances that can be used to
increase benefit levels without changing the financing provisions.
See, e.g., BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND
DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, 1971 ANNUAL REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 88, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 39 (1971).
82 The precise terms of the recommendation were:
The law should provide a guarantee that, in the absence of congressional
action, social security benefits will be at least kept up to date, automatically,
with increases in prices, and that the contribution and benefit base and the
retirement test exempt amount will be automatically adjusted to increases in
earnings levels.
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, REPORTS ON THE OLD-AGE, SURVIVORS, AND DIS-
ABILITY INSURANCE AND MEDICARE PROGRAMS 17 (1971).
The Council's recommendation did not reflect a belief that Congress should abstain
from future ad hoc increases:
[I]f social security benefits are increased to keep up only with increases in the
cost of living, the levels of living of people on the benefit rolls will gradually
decline relative to families of people still working. To assure that this situation
will not continue over a long period of time, the Council believes that the Con-
gress in its future deliberations should take into account increases in the gen-
eral standard of living and provide benefit increases from time'to time that are
higher than increases in the cost of living.
Id. at 20-21.
83 [T~he actuarial cost estimates for the cash benefits program [should] be
based-as the estimates for the hospital insurance program now are-on the
assumptions that earnings levels will rise, that the contribution and benefit base
will be increased as earnings levels rise, and that benefit payments will be in-
creased as prices rise.
Id. at 85.
84 The actuarial recommendation was not, however, conditioned on adoption of the
automatic adjustment recommendation. See id. at 86.
85 See Act of July 1, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-336, §§ 201, 202, 86 Stat. 406.
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D. The Search for Appropriate External Standards
The 1972 amendments codified a particular relationship be-
tween the important components of the system, benefits and cov-
ered wages, and specific measurements of economic change.
Thus, Congress placed the Consumer Price Index and average
covered wages alongside actuarial soundness as statutory stan-
dards.
Previously there was no discernible policy on how benefits
should relate to prior earnings, or what wages should be subject
to the payroll tax, or how large that tax should be. The Act sim-
ply set various parameters, and from time to time Congress
changed them as a consequence of altered economic, social and
political circumstances. The early amendments did not implement
any coherent policy.
By the mid-sixties, experts compared the operation of the
benefit formula for average retirees of various vintages to the
movement of prices and wages. In 1966, for example, this analysis
demonstrated that current payments received by many ben-
eficiaries did not provide the purchasing power of the benefits
they received when first going on the rolls. Moreover, for those
whose benefits had equivalent purchasing power, there had been
substantial periods of lag in correction for price inflation. Finally,
these comparisons revealed that average benefits increased at a
much slower pace than wage levels. 86
National concern with poverty iti the 1960's also influenced
Social Security planners. Experts and advisory councils began to
compare the lower part of the Social Security benefit scale to gen-
eral standards of minimum income. 87 The comparison revealed
that Social Security produced benefits near or below the poverty
level for workers who had been self-sufficient with low but steady
earnings throughout their working years. 8 8 That observation
supported repeated efforts to improve Social Security's perform-
ance at the bottom as a minimum income guarantee for retired
" See Haldman, OASDI Benefits, Prices, and Wages: 1966 Experience, SOC. SEC. BULL.,
June 1967, at 9.
17 See, e.g., L. EPSTEIN, INCOME SECURITY STANDARDS IN OLD-AGE 12-13 (Social Security
Administration Research Rep. No. 3, 1963); 1971 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY,
REPORTS ON THE OLD-AGE, SURVIVORS, AND DISABILITY INSURANCE AND MEDICARE PRO-
GRAMIS 19-20 (1971); Reno & Zuckert, Benefit Levels of Newly Retired Workers: Findings From
the Survey of New Beneficiaries, Soc. SEC. BULL., July 1971, at 3, 22-24.
"8 See, e.g., ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, REPORTS ON THE OLD-AGE, SUR-




persons.89 In addition, experts continued to debate the validity of
the connection between program benefits and the payroll tax.90
Prior to the early seventies, however, no widely-used analytic
tool existed that permitted assessment of the performance of the
Social Security benefit formula above the realm of minimal
adequacy. The scheme's fairness to similar individuals of different
age and years of retirement, its fairness to groups with differing
wage patterns retiring at the same time and its performance over
time as amended by Congress, were matters that received in-
adequate attention in the debates over Social Security, both inside
and outside Congress. Some of that inattention must be blamed
on the difficulty of describing and measuring the relevant charac-
teristics of the program. The terms of the legislation, which pro-
vided the framework for most discussion of the benefit schedule,
did not (given changing wage and price levels) facilitate considera-
tion of questions of equity and adequacy. 91 The system had so
completely rejected return on contribution as the benefit model,
that the program's policymakers rejected insights based on calcu-
lations employing that model.
92
In the early seventies, the concept of "replacement" rate or
ratio began to fill the analytic void. Within five years, it predomi-
nated in discussions of Social Security benefit schedule revi-
sion. 93  The phrase had been used in a number of earlier studies,
'9 See Martin, supra note 19, at 479-88.
90 See RETIREMENT INCOME STUDY, supra note 24, at 39-47, 65-82; J. BRIrrAIN, THE
PAYROLL TAX FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 1-20 (1972); J. PECHMAN, H. AARON, & M. TAuSSIG,
supra note 61, at 173-213.
" Some experts writing on Social Security during the 1960s expressed the need for an
appropriate external standard for evaluating system performance. See, e.g., L. EPSTEIN,
supra note 87; Bok, Emerging Issues in Social Legislation: Social Security, 80 HARV. L. REV. 717,
752-59 (1967).
92 During the early years of the system, nearly all age cohorts, family groups, and
income segments received benefits far in excess of contribution. Attention to relative re-
turn on contribution has grown in recent years as certain sizable groups (e.g., working
spouses) have attacked the system's failure to give them any appreciable benefit increment
for their contribution and as the prospect of an inadequate return for young worker-
contributors becomes a reality. See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, SOCIAL SE-
CURITY FINANCING AND BENEFITS 61-63 (1979); HEW, SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE CHANGING
ROLES OF MEN AND WOMEN 28-29 (1979); R. KAPLAN, INDEXING SOCIAL SECURITY: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES 66-67 (1977).
93 A Social Security Administration study of new beneficiaries published in 1971 made
no use of the replacement rate concept. See Reno & Zuckert, supra note 87. By the mid-
seventies, however, some were suggesting that replacement rates held too great a domi-
nance over Social Security analysis. See R. KAPLAN, supra note 92, at 41-43. See also CONSUL-
TANT PANEL ON SOCIAL SECURITY TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 94TH CONG.,
2D SESS., REPORT 21 (joint Comm. Print 1976).
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but its pre-1970 meaning was almost invariably linked to the So-
cial Security benefit formula itself. Thus, replacement's former
orientation made it a poor device for viewing the benefit formula
critically. 94
'As the term came to be used in the seventies, replacement
rate referred to the ratio of benefits, for an individual or class of
individuals, to immediate pre-retirement earnings. The concept
was logically derived from the avowed purpose of social insurance
programs like OASDI, namely, the partial replacement of lost
earnings. Replacement furnished a useful extrinsic measure of the
performance of the benefit formula.9 5  The Social Security ben-
efit amendments of 1972, which included the first automatic
adjustment provisions, were enacted without reference to
replacement rates in this sense. However, a panel of economists
and actuaries reporting to a subcommittee of the 1971 Advisory
Council, which recommended the 1972 automatic adjustment
provisions, warned:
94 For example, the important book by Pechman, Aaron and Taussig, Social Security:
Perspectives for Reform, published in 1968, analyzed the "replacement rates" under the 1967
amendments to the Social Security Act for various beneficiary groups, but calculated its
replacement rate by comparing "monthly benefit awards" to "average monthly earnings."
See J. PECHMAN, H. AARON, & M. TAUSSIG, supra note 61, at 80. The book does, however,
sketch the advantages of indexing wage records particularly during periods of inflation. See
id. at 97-98.
During the late fifties and early sixties there was far less reason to construct a distinct
replacement rate concept since the Social Security benefit formula came close to resting on
immediate pre-retirement earnings. The retired worker's average monthly earnings figure
represented only a few years, and for many workers the highest years were those im-
mediately prior to retirement.
Social Security Administration research reports on replacement rates across time were
similarly based on the legislation's benefit formula "average monthly earnings" figure. See
CECCARELLI & SKOLNIK, WAGE-REPLACEMENT RATES UNDER THE OASDHI RETIREMENT
PROVISIONS (Social Security Administration, Research & Statistics Note No. 18, 1973).
On those rare occasions when Congressional committees used the term, benefits were
compared to average earnings. See H.R. REP. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1967):
[Y]our committee has carefully studied the matter of wage-replacement upon
retirement, disability or death of the wage-earner and has sought to establish a
reasonable relationship between former wages and benefits. Thus, the bill em-
bodies the principle that the retirement benefit for a man age 65 and his wife
should represent at least 50 percent of his average wages under the social se-
curity system. (Emphasis added).
's See Merriam, Income Maintenance, in SOCIAL SECURITY IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
55-82 (S. Jenkins ed. 1969); J. SCHULZ, G. CARRIN, H. KRUPP, M. PESCHKE, F. SCLAR, & J.
VAN STEENBERGE, PROVIDING ADEQUATE RETIREMENT INCOME: PENSION REFORM IN THE
UNITED STATES AND ABROAD 18-20 (1974); Henley, Recent Trends in Retirement Benefits Re-
lated to Earnings, MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1972, at 12; Horlick, The Earnings Replacement
Rate of Old-Age Benefits: An International Comparison, Soc. SEC. BULL., Mar. 1970, at 3.
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While past and proposed legislative actions have approximately
achieved the goal of maintenance of purchasing power [of ben-
efits], the replacement rates have shifted over time and between
different levels of average wages. There has been insufficient
analyses or public discussion of the role of replacement rate in
prescribing the benefit formulas.... Careful study and serious
consideration should be given before establishing a specific pol-
icy about replacement rates. However, the policy should be
explicit and not implicit. 96
By 1975, replacement rates were receiving a great deal of
attention. The 1975 Advisory Council's report demonstrated that,
with continuing high inflation, the automatic adjustment provi-
sions in the amended act would produce absurdly generous re-
placement rates, paying more in benefits than a retiree's prior
earnings. On the other hand, different wage and price conditions
would produce replacement rates far below current levels. 97  "The
result is that replacement rates, instead of being controlled by
conscious and deliberate policy set by Congress, can fluctuate up
or down with the tides of inflation." 98  The Advisory Council
characterized this quite accurately as "a flaw [of the system] which
was probably never intended." 99  It was a feature of the system
difficult to perceive without the new concept of replacement
rate. 100 It was also a flaw that had relatively slight consequences
under the conservative wage and price estimates underlying the
proposals and legislation of 1971 and 1972. A 1977 Congressional
Budget Office study on Social Security financing observed: "The
automatic provision for indexing future benefits received little at-
tention because combinations of wage and price increases that
cause great instability were not seriously considered."''
96 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 82, at 125.
9' QUADRENNIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 75,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 103-06 (1975).
98 Id. at 15.
99 Id. at 103.
100 This potential instability of the "coupled" formula was recognized by the experts, but
discounted. Robert Myers, Chief Actuary for the Social Security Administration, testified in
1969 that the automatic adjustment technique (enacted eventually in 1972) would work
well "unless we came into a time when there was a run-away inflation," but he concluded
that such a possibility could "be ignored." Social Security and Welfare Proposals, Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 204 (1970).
Decoupled methods of indexing had been discussed prior to 1972, but compared to
the 1972 approach they seemed more complicated and a sharper break with the past. See
Cohen, Federalism and Social Insurance, in THE PRINCETON SYMPOSIUM ON THE AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF SOCIAL INSURANCE 12-14 (1968).
'01 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FINANCING SOCIAL SECURITY: ISSUES FOR THE SHORT
AND LONG TERM 42 (1977). Early conservative wage and price predictions produced stable
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THE "FLAWS" IN THE 1972 "COUPLED" FORMULA
Without considering post-1972 concepts and economic ex-
perience, it is difficult to view the 1972 amendments as "flawed"
or "mistaken." The 1972 adjustment provisions were attractively
simple and had the advantage of treating equally those a few
years before retirement and persons already receiving benefits.
They also reflected the pattern of ad hoc adjustments legislated in
preceding years. When passed, they drew little criticism and con-
siderable favorable comment. 102 The first recommendation of
the 1971 Advisory Council on Social Security was that the pro-
gram's benefit and contribution formulae should be automatically
adjusted to changes in prices and earnings levels. 10 3 The 1972
amendment did just that.
Experts thought the financing demands of benefit adjust-
ments and the principle of actuarial soundness were adequately
dealt with by the parallel automatic adjustment of wages subject to
the Social Security tax. The Council's report explained that earn-
ings levels tend to increase faster than prices. Planners concluded
that the resulting increase in contributions would finance benefit
increases attributable both to price increases and higher earnings
records. 104
projected replacement rates. See id.; BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND
SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, 1973 ANNUAL REPORT,
H.R. Doc. No. 130, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1973).
102 Indeed, an automatic adjustment provision had previously passed the House in 1970
with the support of the Republicans, who favored automatic increases over the ad hoc
increases used by a Democratic Congress for political gain. See M. DERTHICK, supra note 1,
at 345-50.
The 20% benefit increase, passed at the same time as the automatic adjustment provi-
sion, was the controversial feature of the 1972 legislation. See 28 CONGRESSIONAL QUAR-
TERLY ALIANAC 399 (1972).
103 The Council urged:
The law should provide a guarantee that, in the absence of congressional
action, social security benefits will be at least kept up to date, automatically,
with increases in prices, and that the contribution and benefit base and the
retirement test exempt amount will be automatically adjusted to increases in
earnings levels.
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 82, at 7.
104 The automatic adjustment of benefits to changes in prices can be fully fi-
nanced over the long run without any increases in the contribution rates if the
contribution and benefit base is increased as wage levels increase. Earnings
levels tend to increase faster than prices, since they reflect productivity in-
creases as well as price increases, and only about one half of the increases in
income to the social security program that result from rising wages will be
needed to meet the cost of higher benefit payments resulting from the higher
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:748
A report by the Office of the Actuary of the Social Security
Administration supported the Advisory Council's estimate, but
was more careful in noting its underlying assumptions about
economic conditions over the next 75 years. One assumption was that
"the rate of increase in wage levels [would remain] approximately
twice the rate of increase in price levels." The actuary cautioned:
"The estimates [of fiscal balance] are extremely sensitive to the
stated assumptions as to wage and price increases."' 10 5
Congress ignored this warning. Welfare reform was the dom-
inant Social Security Act issue in 1972 and Congress enacted the
automatic adjustment and 20% one-time increase without exten-
sive debate or hearings. Sponsors of the provisions in both the
House and Senate relied solely on the recommendations of the
1971 Advisory Council. The amendments were tacked on to a bill
to extend the debt ceiling which had to be passed in the final days
of June, before the end of the fiscal year. 106
A year later, in June 1973, Congress again adjusted the ben-
efit formula without benefit of hearings or careful delibera-
wages credited to the worker's social security earnings record. If the contribu-
tion and benefit base is kept up to date with rising earnings, the additional
income that becomes available to the program and that is not needed to meet
additional benefit liabilities based on the higher covered earnings would at least
be sufficient over the long run to finance automatic increases in benefits.
Id. at 18.
15 Id. at 113.
The calculations attesting to the actuarial soundness of the 1972 amendments assumed
average annual price increases of 2 3/4% and 5% average annual wage increases. The 1973
trustees' report estimated that a difference of 1/2% in the average rate of price increases
would produce a significant long-term deficit. See BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL
OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, 1973 AN-
NUAL REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 130, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 31, 41-42 (1973).
106 See Act of July 1, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-336, 86 Stat. 406; M. DERTHICK, supra note 1,
at 359-62; RETIREMENT INCOME STUDY, supra note 24, at 58-62. John Byrnes, senior Repub-
lican member of the House Ways and Means Committee, protested strenuously on the
floor of the House:
[T]o appear here as a member of the Committee on Ways and Means, to
discuss a matter of this importance with so little information for the members
of... the Congress, is something that I thought I would never have to experi-
ence in my service in this House.
This is no way to treat vitally important legislation.
At no point has there been a study by the Ways and Means Committee of
the new method of [calculating actuarial soundness] that has produced the
"windfall" that now is going to be used for the 20 percent- benefit increase. Not
one word of testimony in public or executive session has been received on this
subject. This fundamental change in the criteria by which the soundness of the
social security trust fund has been measured for one-third of a century is being
adopted willy-nilly by the Congress without even a cursory review.
118 CONG. REC. 23,732-33 (1972).
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tion.'1 7  The rapid climb in the Consumer Price Index during
the first six months of 1973 prompted the Senate Finance Com-
mittee to amend that year's public debt limit bill to move up the
effective date of the first automatic increase from January 1975 to
June 1974. 108
The continuing climb of prices led the Senate Finance Com-
mittee to introduce another amefidment in late 1973. Signed by
President Nixon on the final day of the year, the amendment sub-
stituted a two step 11% increase in the benefit formula for the
5.9% increase the automatic adjustment provision would have
produced in June 1974.109 The first increase of 7% took effect
immediately."t 0 The amendment not only produced a larger and
earlier increase than the automatic provisions of the prior legisla-
tion, but altered the automatic adjustment provisions to reduce
the lag between price increases and benefit schedule response."'
Both 1973 amendments increased the annual tax base to help
meet the additional costs of the larger benefits."
2
It was not until June 1975 that the automatic adjustment
provisions of 1972, as amended in 1973, were allowed to generate
their first increase-a benefit rise of 8%. By then it was clear that
the program had a long-term deficit due in part to the interplay
between the automatic adjustment provisions and revised
economic projections. 113  Social Security's automatically adjusting
107 See Act of July 9, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-66, § 201, 87 Stat. 152 (1973).
10 See 119 CONG. REC. 21,582, 21,587, 21,622-28, 22,394-404, 22,605-10, 22,642-46
(1973). See also RETIREMENT INCOME STUDY, supra note 24, at 62-63.
Parliamentary objections in the House caused the amendments to be deleted from the
public debt bill and added to a bill extending the Renegotiation Act. Act of July 9, 1973,
Pub. L. No. 93-66, 87 Stat. 152. See 119 CONG. REC. 22,382, 22,398-404 (1973); RETiRE-
MENT INCOME STUDY, supra note 24, at 63.
109 See Act of December 31, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-233, §§ 1, 2, 87 Stat. 947 (1973);
RETIREMENT INCOME STUDY, supra note 24, at 63-65.
110 See Act of December 31, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-233, § 1, 87 Stat. 947 (1973).
" Id. § 3.
Under the original adjustment provisions, the cost-of-living figures for the second
quarter of the year produced benefit increases effective the following January. The
amended provisions used first quarter figures and adjusted benefits beginning in June of
the same year. See H.R. REP. No. 627, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 .(1973).
112 See Act of July 9, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-66, § 202, 87 Stat. 152 (1973); Act of De-
cember 31, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-233, § 5, 87 Stat. 947 (1973).
"' Notice of the 8% increase was issued on May 22, 1975. See 40 Fed. Reg. 22,289
(1975).
Nearly a year before, the annual report of the Board of Trustees forecast a signficant
deficit-approximately 3% of taxable payroll. While the report attributed most of the def-
icit to new demographic assumptions, it also drew attention to the dependence of the fi-
nancial condition of the system on unpredictable long term economic factors. See BOARD OF
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benefit formula thus posed a serious threat to actuarial soundness.
The formula was drawn into a growing Social Security debate
energized by an ever-increasing projected actuarial deficit.1 14  Ben-
efit formula revision was pushed into the policy arena not be-
cause it could offer more equitable treatment of groups with dif-
fering wage histories and dates of retirement-though it
could-but because without dramatic change on the benefit side,
a major long-term deficit loomed. Interest in that long-term def-
icit was fueled by serious short-term financial problems.' 1 5
The automatic adjustment provisions created another serious
problem. As the 1975 Advisory Council pointed out, the 1972
amendments, and the ad hoc adjustments that preceded them,
were designed to allow benefits to keep pace with inflation. 1 6
However, in periods of rapid inflation of the sort experienced in
the early seventies, the formula overcompensated future retirees.
The new replacement rate analysis revealed this otherwise latent
problem. Studies employing plausible assumptions about wage
and price growth estimated that replacement rates would climb to
absurd levels under the 1972 formula. Since low-wage- workers
forty or fifty years hence would have replacement rates in excess
of 100%, they would receive retirement benefits exceeding their
pre-retirement earnings. 117 Clearly, Congress did not intend this
result. Congress expected that benefits would be adjusted to keep
pace with inflation. It had not intended them to outpace inflation;
yet the 1972 formula allowed that to happen by counting wage
and price increases twice for future retirees.
TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND DISABILITY INSURANCE
TRUST FUNDS, 1974 ANNUAL REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 313, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 27, 34-38
(1974).
114 See M. DERTHICK, supra note 1, at 381-84.
115 See A. MUNNELL, supra note 11, at 93-99.
116 See QUADRENNIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 97, at 13.
Ifl See, e.g., A. MUNNELL, supra note 11, at 31; QUADRENNIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON
SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 97, at 131-32; L. THOMPSON, AN ANALYSIS OF THE FACTORS
CURRENTLY DETERMINING BENEFIT LEVEL ADJUSTMENTS IN THE SOCIAL SECURITY RETIRE-
MENT PROGRAM 16-17 (HEW, Office of Income Security Policy, Technical Analysis Paper
No. 1, 1974):
If allowed to operate without any offsetting influences, these adjustment provi-
sions can, over time, have the result of increasing replacement ratiosto 1.00 or
more, implying retirement benefits that equal or exceed the retiree's previous
wages. While it is possible for reasonable men to disagree over what constitutes a
reasonable replacement ratio, it ought to be possible for them to agree that there
is something amiss with the present arrangement. For the behavior of replace-
ment ratios over time ought to be controlled by conscious policy decision and
not by the rate of inflation, especially when it is possible for those ratios to rise
to the point where the average worker will get a retirement benefit that is
greater than his wage.
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Understanding how the old formula counted inflation twice
requires a closer look at how inflation was handled within the
benefit framework established in 1950. The 1950 amendments re-
sponded to wage changes with a formula based on post-
amendment wages. Those retiring in the fifties received benefits
calculated by applying stipulated percentages to their post-1950,
pre-retirement covered earnings. Pre-1950 taxed and covered
earnings were ignored for most retirees. For later retirees, the
earnings, starting point for benefit calculation remained essentially
the same-average covered earnings computed over a post-1950,
pre-retirement base period. 118 Congress occasionally raised the
wage base to adjust for increased average wages. The Act set the
base at $3,000 for the years 1951-54, $4,200 for 1955-58, $4,800
for 1959-65, and so on. 119 Each increase in the wage base meant
that more workers' wage increases were reflected in their average
covered wage figures. Nonetheless, the benefit calculation for a
retiree collecting Social Security benefits for the first time in the
late seventies began with an average earnings figure that included
wages paid at fifties' rates and subject to fifties' ceilings.
1 2 0
The principal price inflation adjustment was accomplished by
increasing the multipliers applied to the average earnings figure.
From 1965 on, the pattern of adjustment was roughly this: Ben-
efit increases were achieved by increasing the multipliers, in-
creasing the wage base (which had a long-term effect on possible
benefits), and adding on a new wage bracket at the top to cover
the larger average earnings figures possible under the new wage
base.1 21  The automatic adjustment pattern of the 1972 amend-
ments took this same form. 122
Such a technique of adjustment overcompensated for infla-
tion in the following sense. A worker experiencing typical wage
growth between 1975 and 1976, for example, first benefitted
from that increase through its effect on his average earnings fig-
ure. Assuming price growth during the same period, the w6rker
would also have higher multipliers applied to the higher average
18 See Soc. SEC. BULL.-ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1975, at 18.
119 See id. at 32.
120 Assuming that the worker's five lowest earnings years were 1951-55, they were not
averaged in; but the formula counted earnings for 1956-58, when the wage base was only
$4,200 and the median earnings figures for a covered worker were even less, 1959 when
the wage base was $4,800, and so on. See id. at 32, 72.
121 See Table 2 supra.
122 See Act of July 1, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-336, § 215(i)(2)(D)(v), 86 Stat. 406.
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wage. One year's inflation was thus counted twice. 123 This
double-counting arose because the system used the same method
to adjust benefits for present recipients and future retirees. Both
received identical adjustment of the multipliers; post-retirement
and pre-retirement inflation adjustment were "coupled." 124  Re-
placement rate studies demonstrated that the cumulative effects of
the system's double-counting could be extreme during periods of
high wage and price inflation. 125
The 1977 decoupling amendments were politically feasible
because, under the old coupled formula, actuarial projections
showed a serious long-term deficit and replacement rate analysis
forecast benefits exceeding historic levels and the absolute bench-
mark of full replacement. Equally critical was Congress' percep-
tion that decoupling did not really revise benefits, but rather
replaced a faulty method of inflation adjustment with a more
accurate mechanism-one that did not count inflation twice.
III
THE RESPONSE: HOW THE 1977 AMENDMENTS WORK
The 1977 amendments "decoupled" 1 26 the Social Security
benefit formula by establishing two distinct systems: one for adjusting
the wage record on which an individual's benefits are calcu-
lated to reflect changing economic conditions, and another for
123 The effects of this double counting were softened by two additional features of the
benefit formula. First, higher average wages moved a worker into different brackets with
lower multipliers. While the multipliers in each bracket were adjusted with price increases,
the boundaries between brackets remained the same. Second, through 1994 each successive
class of retirees had an additional year's earnings averaged in. The additional year was a
year of early and therefore relatively low earnings. See A. MUNNELL, supra note 11, at
33-36; L. THOMPSON, supra note 117, at 17-24.
124 See Thompson, Indexing Social Security: The Options, in FINANCING SOCIAL SECURITY 41
n. 1 (C. Campbell ed. 1979). In addition, the formula might overadjust benefits for inflation
because it ignored the economic connection between wage and price inflation, making
separate adjustments for both.
125 The House Ways and Means Committee report on the 1977 amendments stated that
"[clurrent projections show that benefit levels will rise by about 50 percent more than
wages over the next 75 years, with most of this increase occurring after the 1990's. Re-
placement rates can fluctuate widely in the future, either up or down, depending on future
changes in wages and prices." H.R. REP. No. 702, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 22, reprinted in
[1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4155, 4179.
A table in the report showed the replacement rate for a low-earnings worker crossing
100% about the year 2040. Id. at 24, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
4181.
126 Experts adopted the term "decoupling" to describe the policy alternatives devised to
correct the problem of "coupling" in the 1972 automatic adjustment provisions. See
Thompson, supra note 124, at 41 n.l.
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adjusting benefits, once available, to prevent purchasing power
erosion.
The formula adopted in 1977 indexes the worker's wage rec-
ord by increasing his past wages to reflect their value in terms of
more recent wage levels. The formula then applies a set of un-
changing multipliers to the individual's average indexed earn-
ings. 127  The benefit amount produced by that formula is sub-
sequently adjusted upward to reflect cost-of-living increases.
128
Any year's wage and price movements count only once in the
benefit calculation for a particular individual. Those movements,
however, have different effects on employed and retired workers.
In the case of employed workers, a given year's increase in aver-
age wages is ultimately reflected through wage-indexing. For
those already entitled to benefits, price increases, measured by the
Consumer Price Index, produce a proportionate benefit increase.
The following computations illustrate how the new formula
will work for high, medium, and low-wage workers.
A. Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME)
The indexing of earnings called for by the new formula uses
average earnings figures promulgated by the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare. 129 The formula uses average
earnings for the year two years before the individual's sixty-
second birthday, death or disability as its indexing base.130 Thus,
1978 is the base year for an individual attaining sixty-two, dying
or becoming disabled in 1980. The HEW average wage figure for
1978 is $10,556.03.131 A worker's indexed earnings for past
years are calculated by multiplying his or her covered earnings for
each year by an index number equal to the ratio of the average
earnings figure for 1978 ($10,556.03) to the average earnings fig-
ure for the year being adjusted. 132 For example, if a worker had
the maximum possible $9,000 of covered earnings in 1972, in-
dexed earnings for 1972 would equal $9,000 multiplied by
$10,556.03/$7,133.80 (the average earnings figure for 1972), or
$13,317.48.
127 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 415(a)-(b) (Supp. 1 1977); 20 C.F.R. § 404.212 (1979).
128 See 42 U.S.C. § 415(i)(2)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1 1977); 20 G.F.R. § 404.221 (1979).
129 See 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(3)(A) (Supp. 1 1977); 43 Fed. Reg. 60,877-78, 61,016 (1978).
130 See 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(3)(A) (Supp. 1 1977); 20 C.F.R. § 404.212a(b) (1979).
131 See 44 Fed. Reg. 62,956-57 (1979).
122 See 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(3)(A) (Supp. 1 1977); 20 C.F.R. § 404.212a(b) (1979).
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Table 3 sets forth the HEW average earnings figures begin-
ning with the year 1951 (the earliest includable year under the
formula), the ratio of each year's average to that for 1978 (the
































































Sources: 43 Fed. Reg. 61,016 (1978); 44 Fed. Reg. 62,956 (1979).
A person reaching sixty-two in 1980 has a benefit base
period of twenty-four years. His or her average indexed earnings
figure is calculated over that twenty-four year base, using the
twenty-four years after 1950 with highest indexed earnings. The
period will be twenty-five years for those reaching sixty-two in




























































































until the maximum base period of thirty-five years is reached-
for those turning sixty-two in 1991.133
1. High-Earnings Worker
For a person with high earnings -earnings at least equal to
the maximum countable earnings level each year-the Average
Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) will be based on indexed earn-
ings in the years 1951 through 1979, omitting 1962-65 and 1954.
The base year, 1978, and any subsequent years (in this case 1979)
are counted, but not indexed.1 34  This averaging process
yields an annual indexed earnings figure of $14,497 for the
high-earnings individual and an AIME of $1,208.00.
2. Middle- and Low-Earnings Worker
The averaging process is the same for all workers reaching
sixty-two in 1980. Although the five lowest indexed years for our
hypothetical high-earnings worker were defined by the system (those
five years when maximum countable earnings stood lowest in rela-
tion to average earnings), the low five years for middle-
and low-earnings workers will depend on the individual's earnings
history. If the worker's earnings increased in relation to average
earnings over the post-1950 period, the five lowest indexed years
will be 1951 through 1955. (A worker reaching sixty-two in 1980
was already thirty-three in 1951-past the years when most have
their lowest earnings relative to the average.) Some workers will
have lower later years. For those who have dropped out of cov-
ered employment in order to care for children, or because of in-
voluntary unemployment, the lowest five years will include years
with zero indexed earnings. Table 4 shows the annual earnings
and indexed earnings for a worker reaching age sixty-two in 1980
who received earnings equal to the median for workers of the
same age each year since 1950. This worker's lowest five indexed
years are 1951, 1958, 1959, 1963 and 1973; Average Indexed
Monthly Earnings (AIME) are $864.00.
133 See 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(2) (Supp. 1 1977).
M' See 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(3)(B) (Supp. I 1977).
A high-earnings worker's indexed earnings will reach the indexed maximum earnings
figure each year. Thus, the omitted years will be the five years during the base .period with
the lowest maximum figure after indexing, in this case, 1965, 1964, 1963, 1962 and 1954.
See Table 3 supra.
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Sources: Soc. SEC. BULL.-ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1965, Table 33, at 36; Soc.
SEC. BULL.-ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1975, Table 42, at 75.
Table 4 also shows earnings for a hypothetical low-earnings
worker. This worker received one-half the median annual earn-
ings for workers of the same age since 1950-a figure falling
slightly below earnings at the minimum wage with steady
employment.135 The AIME for such a worker is $432.00.
B. Converting AIME to Primary Insurance Amount (PIA)
The 1977 Amendments substituted wage indexing for annual
adjustments in the multipliers previously used to convert average
covered earnings to benefit amounts. The new formula applies
'35 See Martin, supra note 17, at 495.
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constant multipliers to three different AIME brackets. Although
the multipliers do not change, the boundaries between brackets
shift annually in response to movement in average wages. 136 The
formula for converting AIME to Primary Insurance Amount
(PIA) for workers reaching age sixty-two in 1980 is as follows:
PIA = 90% of the first $194 of AIME, plus
32% of the next $977 of AIME, plus
15% of any balance (exceeding $1,171).
137
Table 5 shows the PIAs this produces for the high-, middle-





AIME $1,208.00 $864.00 $432.00
PIA
90% of first
$194 of AIME $ 174.60 $174.60 $174.60
32% of next
$977 of AIME 312.64 214.40 76.16
15% of any
balance 5.55 -
Total $ 492.49 $389.00 $250.76
Transitional Guarantee
Old Formula, Dec. 1978
Schedule
AME $ 729.50 $498.20 $249.10
PIA $ 503.40 $388.20 $248.70
Sources: 44 Fed. Reg. 62,956 (1979); 20 C.F.R. § 404.223 (1979).
C. Price-Indexing for Those Eligible to Receive Benefits
The PIA is adjusted as prices increase, using the Consumer
Price Index (CPI). The PIA of a worker turning sixty-two in 1980
will be increased as of June 1980 and thereafter in proportion to
CPI increases. 138
136 See 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(A)-(1)(B) (Supp. 1 1977).
137 See id; 44 Fed. Reg. 62,956 (1979).
138 See 42 U.S.C. § 415(i)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. I 1977). In May, HEW announced the June
1980 adjustment to be 14.3%. See 45 Fed. Reg. 31,781 (1980).
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D. Working Past Sixty-Two
The PIA formula outlined in the preceding subsections
applies whether or not an individual actually claims retired-
worker benefits at age sixty-two. Years of covered employment
after the wage-indexing base year (after 1978 in the case of those
reaching sixty-two in 1980) can be substituted for lower, earlier
years in the AIME calculation, but they are not indexed. 139 If
our hypothetical high-earnings worker continued in covered
employment until age sixty-five (1983), he would have earnings
figures of $25,900 for 1980, $29,700 for 1981, and $31,800 for
1982-the maximum covered earnings figures for those years es-
tablished by the 1977 amendments. 14 0 The worker's AIME
would still be based on the best twenty-four years after 1950.
These three most recent unindexed years would be over twice the
indexed earnings for 1958, 1953 and 1957, otherwise included in
the average. Consequently, they will produce a better AIME.
For a high-earnings worker, the additional dollars of AIME
fall entirely in the 15% bracket and thereby yield only modest
improvement in PIA. 141 However, delaying benefits has a second
effect on the monthly amount. A retired worker who begins col-
lecting benefits at age sixty-two receives only eighty percent of his
PIA. 142 For each month benefits are delayed, the monthly
amount increases by 5/9 of 1% of the PIA, until age sixty-five
when 100% of the PIA is available. 143  Further delay adds to the
monthly amount at a lower rate-3% per year up to age seventy-
two. 144  Whether or not benefits are received at age sixty-two,
PIA adjustments based on price increases begin with the sixty-
second year.
1 45
'3 See 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(3).(B) (Supp. 1 1977); 20 C.F.R. § 404.212a(b)(v) (1979).
140 See 42 U.S.C. § 430(c) (Supp. I 1977).
141 See Table 5 supra. During 1980, the 15% rate applies to all amounts of AIME above
$1,171. See text at note 137 supra. That is the equivalent of indexed annual earnings
slightly above $14,000. Only a worker with maximum or near maximum taxable earnings
in recent years will be in that range. Compare the AIMEs calculated for the high-earnings
and middle-earnings workers at notes 134-35 and, accompanying text supra.
142 See 42 U.S.C. § 402(q)(1)(A) (1976).
1- Id.
144 The 3% figure applies to workers reaching sixty-two after December, 1978. See 42
U.S.C. § 402(w) (1976).
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 415(i)(2)(A)(iii) (Supp. 1 1977).
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E. Disability and Survivors Benefits
The benefit formula treats death and disability as equivalents
of attaining age sixty-two. A worker dying or becoming disabled
in 1980 has past earnings indexed and converted into a PIA as
outlined in subsections A and B.
146
In cases of death and disability, the worker may be much
younger when his earnings are indexed. Thus, the AIME may be
calculated over a substantially shorter averaging period. The stat-
ute calculates benefits based on earnings in the years after 1950
or the year of the worker's twenty-first birthday, if later. 147  The low-
est five earnings years are omitted from the calculation.1 48  A
worker dying at age thirty in 1980 would, therefore, have an
AIME based on only three years' earnings.149  Table 6 shows the
PIA calculation for such a worker. Eligible surviving spouses,
children, and parents receive benefits based on the worker's
PIA. 15 0  If the same worker were disabled in 1980, he would re-
ceive a disabled worker benefit equal to 100% of the PIA. 15 1 Sub-
ject to the family maximum, the worker's spouse and children
would also each receive individual benefits at a rate of 50% of the
worker's PIA. 1
52
146 See notes 129-37 and accompanying text supra.
147 See 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(2)(B)(iii) (Supp. 1 1977). A minimum of two earnings years is
required. See 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 1 1977).
148 Id.
149 The worker turned twenty-one in 1971. There are eight years between 1972 and
1980, of which the five lowest indexed earnings years are omitted.
The Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980 alter the benefit calculation for
some future disability insurance claimants. This will occur as the result of two changes in
the formula. First, the legislation substitutes a variable dropout year schedule for the flat
five years in the present law. A disability benefit recipient under twenty-seven will have his
or her AIME calculated with only one low earnings year rather than five excluded from
the average. For workers between their twenty-seventh and thirty-second birthdays, the
amendments provide two dropout years, and so on, adding one dropout year for each five
of additional age. Claimants forty-seven and older will continue to have the full five years.
Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 962-65, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
3102, 94 Stat. 441.
The second change has no effect on the worker's benefit per se, but cuts back on the
total family benefits payable on account of disability for some middle and low-income
workers. The reduction takes the form of a new family maximum set in relation to the
worker's AIME and PIA. Id. § 101.
1'o See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b)-(d), 403(a) (Supp. 1 1977).
151 See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1) (1976).
152 See 42 U.S.C. § 402(b), (c), (d) (1976 & Supp. 1 1977).
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TABLE 6
Benefit Calculation for High-Earnings Worker












90% of first $ 174.60
$194 of AIME
32% of next 312.64
$977 of AIME
15% of any 67.65
balance
Total $ 554.89
* Five "dropout years."
t The AIME is lowered from $1,622.50 to $1,622.00 because of 20 C.F.R. § 404.212a(b)(v)
(1979), which states: "If the AIME as computed is not a multiple of $1, reduce it to the
next lower multiple of $1." Id.
F. Transition
The 1977 amendments do not fully approximate benefits
that would have been payable under prior law to newly eligible
individuals. Congress deliberately cut back 5-10% on the replace-
ment rate. 153 To soften the shift, workers attaining age sixty-two
prior to 1984 are allowed a PIA under the old coupled schedule.
153 Congress finally settled on the benefit formula contained in the House bill, which the
Ways and Means Committee reported would cut back approximately 5% on benefit levels
that would otherwise prevail in January 1979. See H.R. REP. No. 702, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
23, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 4155, 4180.
The high rate of inflation during 1978 had the effect of increasing the cutback.
Under the old formula, inflation in 1978 would have produced higher benefits in 1979
and beyond than those projected when the 1977 amendments were under consideration.
See J. VAN GORKOM, SOCIAL SECURITY REvISITED 20-22 (1979).
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This schedule is frozen, however, at December 1978 rates. 154 The
transition provision does not apply to those dying or becoming
disabled, presumably on the theory that in such cases no firm ex-
pectation of particular benefit amounts existed when the formula
change occurred. 155 Because the old schedule is frozen, even
among old-age beneficiaries, the transitional guarantee holds little
or no value for those reaching sixty-two after 1979.156 Of the
three hypothetical workers considered above, only the high-
earnings worker fares better under the transitional guarantee. 157
IV
SOME POLICY CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW FORMULA
A. Greater Equity for Those with Atypical Earnings Histories
The pre-1977 benefit formula effectively weighed later earn-
ings more heavily than earlier earnings. This occurred because
the formula averaged different years' earnings together without
adjusting for general wage or price level differences among those
years. In 1956, a $4,000 annual earnings figure represented above
154 See 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(4)(B) (Supp. I 1977). The House originally voted for a ten
year transitional guarantee, but later accepted the five year guarantee in the Senate version
of the legislation. See H.R. REP. No. 837, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 67, reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4308, 4313.
155 The House Ways and Means Committee report explained:
Your committee's bill would provide a transitional provision to protect the
benefit rights of people who are now approaching retirement and whose re-
tirement plans have taken social security benefits into account.
The exclusion of disability and death cases from the transitional guarantee
under the bill reflects your committee's concern that benefits in cases where the
worker becomes disabled or dies while young may be significantly higher than
benefits in retirement cases....
Your committee's bill would very substantially reduce-and in some cases
eliminate-the higher early disability and death benefit levels that are possible
under present law. This effect is due to the fact that wage-indexing brings all
earnings up to date, and the length of the computation period becomes less
material.
H.R. REP. No. 702, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4155, 4185-86.
156 For approximately 43% of old-age beneficiaries turning sixty-two in 1979, the transi-
tional guarantee yielded the higher PIA. [1979] 1 UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 12,217 (June
14, 1979).
The transition formula has a further drawback for the individual working past age
sixty-two. In contrast to the new formula, earnings after age sixty-two cannot be substituted
for earlier low years. See 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(4)(B), (b)(4) (Supp. 1 1977).
157 See Table 5 supra.
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average earnings, falling just short of the $4,200 maximum
countable amount. 158 By 1966, $4,000 was below average earn-
ings. a9 Ten years later, $4,000 was below the poverty-level for a
family of three and less than one-half the average earnings fig-
ure.16 ° Prior to the 1977 amendments, however, all $4,000 years
counted equally in the Social Security benefit calculation.
If a worker had a combination of average earnings and
below average or no earnings years, the chronological placement
of those years made a large difference. If the average earnings
years were recent, they would count for $8,631 (1975) or $9,226
(1976); if they fell instead during the mid- to late-fifties they
would be averaged in at less than $4,000. 16 Workers with earn-
ings histories that equalled or exceeded the increase in average
wages were adequately handled by the periodic adjustment of the
multipliers used to convert average earnings to benefit amounts.
Those who earned more in earlier years in relation to the average
suffered. The system also disadvantaged workers who dropped
out of the covered work force later in their careers. Conversely,
the worker who had little covered employment until shortly be-
fore retirement received disproportionately generous benefits. In
many instances, a worker's late spurt of covered work followed a
full career in uncovered public employment with ample compen-
sation and pension. This relative generosity seemed especially in-
equitable.
Since recent years' earnings counted for more under the
pre-1977 formula, those whose benefits rested on a brief, recent
wage record fared better than those with similar or higher recent
earnings, but averaged over a longer period which included
earlier-and therefore substantially lower-earnings. In this way
the formula provided more favorable treatment to workers who
were disabled or died at a relatively young age than to workers
with similar earnings who survived and contributed to a much
later age. If a worker became disabled or died in his early twen-
ties, his or his survivors' basic benefit might rest on average earn-
ings over only his last two years of employment. 162 By contrast,
158 See Table 3 supra; Soc. SEC. BULL.-ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1975, at 32.
159 See Table 3 supra.
160 See id.; Soc. SEC. BULL-ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1975, Table 9, at 46.
161 See Table 3supra.
162 See note 147 supra.
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the worker whose first claim for benefits came at age sixty-two
had recent earnings averaged in with those paid some twenty
years earlier.
The greater equity of a system of earnings-record indexing
should be obvious. Earnings of $4,000 in 1956, 1966, and 1976
represent drastically different positions in the work force and
amounts of purchasing power. Equitable treatment of individuals
with disparate earnings profiles' calls for some reflection of these
differences, especially when benefit calculation rests on a lengthy
period of past earnings. The two most obvious approaches involve
weighting past earnings according to their purchasing power or
relative position in the work force. Either approach provides more
equitable treatment of workers with non-average wage profiles
than does a system without indexing.
B. Further Growth of Benefits
Although it is clear that an indexed system is more desirable
than the 1972 formula, the choice between price and wage index-
ing is far less obvious. Finding the appropriate measure for either
approach is itself a challenge since no single price or wage bench-
mark seems appropriate for adjusting the past earnings of all cov-
ered workers. 
163
Beyond the significant problem of implementation-which
alone might influence the ultimate choice of method-lies a more
fundamental difference. Since 1950, wages have grown at a faster
pace than prices due to increased economic productivity. 164 In-
dexing 1956 earnings as equal to their 1976 earnings equivalent,
as distinct from what they would purchase in the latter year,
builds that productivity gain into the Social Security benefit struc-
ture. The worker's retirement benefit bears a steady relationship
(determined by the 1977 amendment multipliers) to earnings
levels shortly before retirement.
By contrast, a system of price-indexing counts 1956 earnings
based on their purchasing power in the later base year. Sub-
sequent productivity gains are not factored in. Future benefits are
not adjusted for wage increases that surpass price inflation. Over
a lengthy period of productivity gains, a price-indexing system
yields benefits that seem less adequate when measured against
163 See R. KAPLAN, supra note 11, at 27-32.
164 See A. MUNNELL, supra note 11, at 52-55.
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immediate pre-retirement earnings. A wage-indexing system en-
sures that future benefits will keep up with wage growth.
If future benefits are compared to present payrnents or to
the gross national product, wage-indexing appears to commit the
system to growth whereas price-indexing yields stability. On the
other hand, when the criterion of replacement rate is used, wage-
indexing appears to maintain a stable benefit level while price-
indexing leads to gradual shrinkage-higher benefits but lower
replacement rates. 165 Supporters of the 1977 Congressional
wage-indexing scheme characterized it as the path of stability; op-
ponents viewed it as a commitment to benefit growth. Both were
right. 166
V
PREDICTABILITY AND INDIVIDUAL FINANCIAL PLANNING
A. Ease of Benefit Estimation
The Social Security Administration has long asked workers
and their families to regard Title II cash benefits as "provid[ing] a
foundation of retirement income.' 167  Upon this foundation, in-
dividuals are encouraged to build more complete financial security
"with savings, investments, and private pensions."' 168 Needless
to say, information about the size and adequacy of the foundation is
critical to rational planning for retirement, including early decisions
concerning "savings, investments, and private pensions."
16 See M. DERTHICK, supra note 1, at 403-04. Derthick sees the replacement rate concept
as critical to the selection of wage-indexing:
The success of the [wage-indexing] program's leadership, then, must be
attributed in some significant measure to their capacity to define the terms of
debate. They supplied more than a proposal for action; they also supplied the
language with which perceptions were shaped. With their emphasis on re-
placement rates, they defined the base from which changes in direction were to
be gauged, and in a system where backward steps are inconceivable and the
tendency of policymaking is either toward more of the same (inertia) or more
of the same plus a bit (incremental change), the capacity to define where one is
starting from is of crucial importance.
Id. at 405.
166 For a full account of the politics of decoupling, see id. at 387-408.
167 SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY AT YOUR HOUSE (HEW Publica-
tion No. (SSA) 79-10053, Aug. 1979). From the very beginning the agency has distributed
pamphlets and engaged in other forms of mass communication designed to foster the view
that the payroll tax earns future benefits. See A. ALTMEYER, supra note 16, at 69.
168 SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY AT YOUR HOUSE (HEW Publica-
tion No. (SSA) 79-10053, Aug. 1979).
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For years prior to the effective date of the 1977 Amendments,
the Social Security Administration published a booklet entitled Es-
timating Your Social Security Retirement Check.1 69  Although it spoke
principally to those for whom "retirement [lay] just around the
corner," the booklet also invited younger workers to fill in a work-
sheet with annual covered earnings and to calculate an average
earnings figure. A table permitted conversion of that average into
"monthly retirement benefits." 170 After the 1972 automatic adjust-
ment provision was added to the statute, the booklet informed users:
"[f your retirement is some years away, it's likely that benefits will be
higher than this leaflet shows."'
171
Unfortunately, the new formula defies such simple methods of
gelf-estimation. Mere arithmetic averaging and a table will no longer
provide even a rough estimate. Consequently, current agency litera-
ture refrains from providing individualized guidance. For example,
one recent publication entitled Thinking About Retiring? advises in
a section labelled "How much will I get?"
We really cannot answer this question until we check your social
security record, which shows all of your earnings covered by social
security.
When you apply, we will figure your exact benefit rate. Your
rate will depend on the amount of earnings reported for you. The
Frequently, Social Security and private pensions and savings are described as two
layers of a multi-layer income security system. See, e.g., QUADRENNIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL
ON SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 97, at 8-10. The Council's report states:
[Tihe foundations of today's three-part income maintenance system for older
people in retirement-social insurance supplemented by private means and, when
necessary, means-tested programs-were established by this county's first national
social security law....
OASDI should not be expected to perform the entire job of assuring
economic security for the aged and the disabled and their families or for sur-
vivors. A clear understanding of the respective roles and relationships among
social security, private efforts, and means-tested programs is essential to con-
tinued orderly development of effective income support for individuals and
families. As the primary means of partially replacing earnings, OASDI is the
core of the Nation's total system of income protection. OASDI should be
supplemented by effective private pensions (as well as individual insurance, sav-
ings, and other investments), and undergirded by effective means-tested pro-
grams.
Id.
169 The booklet traces back, under various similar titles, to at least 1958. See Wollenberg,
supra note 21, at 312 n.37. The most recent version was issued in 1978. SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, ESTIMATING YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY RETIREMENT CHECK (HEW Publica-





higher your earnings over the years, the closer your benefit rate
will be to the larger figure mentioned below.
[R]ight now, benefits payable to a retired worker who reaches
65 this year range from $121.80 to $503.40 a month....
Once you are on the social security benefit rolls, your checks
will increase automatically to keep pace with increases in the cost of
living.... 172
That does not give much help to a fifty-five year old "thinking about
retirement."
Prior to 1977, SSA booklets and a widely-used looseleaf service
covering Social Security offered workers a clearly delineated method
for estimating future benefits. 1 73 The service now notes that under
the new formula, "it is no longer possible to prepare a completely
accurate table showing what benefit amounts will be in the future." 
1 74
Ironically, although the new formula may defy the computa-
tional ability of many potential beneficiaries, it offers a much more
predictable basis for retirement income planning. The calculations
may be more complex, but attorneys, insurance companies and estate
planners should find it possible to estimate more accurately than
before future retirement benefits for individuals several years away
from eligibility. 175 Indeed, with an adequate worksheet and pocket
calculator, many prospective beneficiaries should be able to manage it
on their own. To explore the estimation possibilities, consider one
more hypothetical worker-this one fifty-five years old in 1980.
Step 1: Calculating the Worker's Current PIA
For such a worker, one can calculate the PIA on which payments
would be based should the individual become eligible for disability
benefits during the year using the indexing process outlined above.
(Remember, disability is treated like age sixty-two in the indexing
process.) 
176
Table 7 shows a covered worker who received earnings equal to
the median for workers of the same age each year since 1951. Should
172 SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, THINKING ABOUT RETIRING? (HEW Publication
No. (SSA) 79-10055 (1979)).
,73 See, e.g., MEDICARE AND SOCIAL SECURITY EXPLAINED (CCH) 4-9, 83-97 (1970).
174 [1979] 1 UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 12,207.
,75 For an illustration, see D. DETLEFS, 1980 GUIDE TO SOCIAL SECURITY.
176 See text at note 147 supra.
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TABLE 7
Middle-Earnings Worker Turning 55 in 1980
Countable
Earnings Countable
Year Worker's Age Indexed Earnings
1951 26 $ 1,797.00 $ 6,776.74*
1952 27 1,916.00 6,802.28*
1953 28 2,045.00 6,876.09*
1954 29 2,032.00 6,797.31*
1955 30 3,225.00 10,311.62
1956 31 3,412.00 10,196.35
1957 32 3,562.00 10,324.95
1958 33 3,541.00 10,174.45*
1959 34 3,777.00 10,340.30
1960 35 3,903.00 10,281.74
1961 36 3,981.00 10,282.85
1962 37 4,187.00 10,299.23
1963 38 4,325.00 10,384.03
1964 39 4,544.00 10,481.48
1965' 40 4,756.00 10,776.45
1966 41 5,054.00 10,803.22
1967 42 5,291.00 10,713.07
1968 43 5,662.00 10,726.99
1969 44 6,105.00 10,934.37
1970 45 6,292.00 10,736.50
1971 46 6,685.00 10,861.35
1972 47 7,210.00 10,668.78
1973 48 7,820.00 10,890.03
1974 49 8,370.00 11,001.94
1975 50 8,755.00 10,707.79
1976 51 9,255.00 10,588.66
1977 52 9,755.00 10,529.65
1978 53 10,255.00 10,255.00
1979 54 10,755.00 10,755.00
AIME $881.00
PIA
90% of first $174.60
$194 AIME




* Five "dropout years."
Sources: Soc. SEC. BULL.-ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1965, Table 33, at 36; Soc. SEC.
BULL.-ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1975, Table 42, at 75.
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this worker become disabled in 1980, 1978 would be the base year for
wage indexing. 17 7 The individual's AIME would be $881.00, yield-
ing a PIA of $394.44.
Knowing potential disability benefits alone is useful, but this
figure can also form the basis for retirement income or survivor
benefit calculations. The ultimate individual monthly benefit de-
pends on three future phenomena: future individual earnings, in-
creases in average wages, and retirement timing. Fortunately, their
effect on the calculated PIA can, fairly easily, be estimated or de-
scribed.
Step 2: Estimating the Effect of Future Earnings
For a steadily employed fifty-five year old person, the bulk of the
earnings that will eventually determine the AIME are a matter of
history. The worker's seven years before age sixty-two will affect the
AIME, but only within limits. First, assume the worst, that the worker
has no countable earnings at all for those years; two zero years will be
averaged in and the five previously disregarded low earnings years
will be used (1951-54 and 1958). With the present indexing base and
PIA formula, this will produce a drop of only $30 a month for our
hypothetical worker. If the seven years ahead produce earnings
bearing the same relationship to average earnings as the person's
career to date, the result will be an unchanged PIA. If they yield
dramatically higher earnings, the PIA will increase. The earnings
must be quite large, however, to have a significant effect because they
are averaged. The range for improvement depends on the gap
between the individual's indexed earnings and the maximum count-
able earnings possible in the years ahead. For a high income worker
the possiblity for substantial improvement is slight-existing only
because of the substantial increases in the wage base that were also
part of the 1977 Social Security Amendment package. For a middle
range worker, it is in theory as much as $60 additional PIA. The
esitmated effect of the next seven years of earnings for any particular
fifty-five year old will lie somewhere between these extremes, falling
in most cases fairly close to the "no change" path.
Step 3: Summarizing the Effect of Increases in Average Wages
Our hypothetical fifty-five year old's retirement PIA will, of
course, be calculated using earnings indexed against a 1985 rather
than a 1978 base. 178 The ranges of the AIME to which the three




different multipliers apply will also be affected by average earnings
increases. 17 9 However, the net effect of these complex future ad-
justments can readily be summarized.
Assume the first two steps yield an approximate PIA of $400,
having adjusted the 1980 disability benefit PIA to account for ex-
pected future but pre-age sixty-two earnings. Wage-indexing means
simply that the 1987 retired worker PIA will be adjusted to reflect
growth in average wages through 1985. The proposition put in terms
most wc/rkers can understand is: Basic benefits will be adjusted
upward so that in 1987 they will be worth roughly the same amount,
in relation to wages, as $400 a month is worth in 1980. The current
wage value of $400 can thus be used as a means of thinking about
future benefits of an uncertain dollar amount.
Step 4: Calculating the Effect of Retirement Timing
Using the PIA approximation of Steps 1 through 3, two
points about retirement timing and benefit amount can be made.
First, pre-age sixty-two retirement can cause a modest reduction in the
basic monthly Social Security benefit (PIA) ultimately available.
Note that anticipated years of no or low earnings before age
sixty-two should already have been figured into the PIA approxi-
mation of Step 2. No Social Security retired-worker benefits can
be drawn before age sixty-two. 180 Second, the approximation of
Step 2 is the monthly benefit payable to a worker starting Social
Security at age sixty-five. Beginning benefits before or after sixty-
five will have calculable effects on the monthly amount. Four
hundred dollars in basic benefits becomes $320 per month for the
worker commencing benefits at age sixty-two and $460 for the
worker delaying retirement to age seventy.
18 1
B. Stability?
Does the 1977 benefit revision signal a period of change-a
further chipping away at a hitherto sacrosanct structure-or has
it brought fundamental stability to the benefit side of the pro-
gram? The answer is far from clear.
179 See text at note 136 supra.
ISO See 42 U.S.C. § 402(a)(2) (1976).
181 See text at notes 142-44 supra.
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A major criticism of the 1972 automatic adjustment provision
was that it rendered the system highly unstable. Some argued that
economic conditions might lead to enormous benefit increases by
the year 2000, measured in terms of immediate pre-retirement
earnings, or equally arbitrary decreases. Benefits were outside the
immediate control of Congress, unless it chose to override the au-
tomatic provision, and were subject to extreme fluctuation caused
by unstable economic conditions. 
1 82
The new system deals with the problem of instability directly.
The system was designed so that benefits would bear a steady re-
lationship to future retirement earnings. Yet looking back,
Congress-not the economy-has contributed most to benefit-
formula instability. Is it realistic to assume now-even though it
would not have been prior to 1977-that Congress will not work
major changes on the earnings-benefit equation? Will Congress
allow the system of 1977 to function according to its terms over
the foreseeable future?,
There are several reasons for believing it will. Barring the
discovery of some latent flaw in the scheme, future economic
changes are not likely to create a compelling need for modifica-
tion. The disastrous consequences possible under the pre-19 7 7
formula have been eliminated.
Concededly, financing the benefits the formula projects is a
problem that will worry Congress throughout the foreseeable fu-
ture. Cutting back on benefits is one way to reduce the financing
pressure. Yet any suggested patent reduction in benefits through
formula revision would face overwhelming opposition. General
benefit cutbacks may be feasible in the distant future, but in the
years immediately ahead, the most likely reductions are cut-backs
only for limited categories of beneficiaries- for example, college
students receiving survivors' benefits or disabled workers receiving
excessive wage replacement-not general revision of the 1977
formula. ' 8 3
In 1976-1977, Congress and the administration opted for a
wage-indexed decoupling plan because they viewed it as neu-
tral.' 84 In contrast, price-indexing was characterized as an ap-
proach that would ultimately reduce the role of Social Se-
112 See text at notes 97-98, 125 supra.
183 The Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980 represent such a reduction. See
note 149 supra.
184 See generally M. DERTHICK, supra note 1, at 397-408.
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curity. 115 If price-indexing was rejected when most thought that
some decoupling scheme had to be substituted for the status quo,
the likelihood of Congressional reconsideration of that choice now
seems slim. Any future proposed. shift to price-indexing would
face far greater obstacles than the approach encountered in
1976-1977. It was a strong candidate to replace the 1972 coupled
formula, 186 but now that the 1977 wage-indexed formula is in
place, the marginal advantages of price-indexing appear incapable
of generating the political force necessary to displace a function-
ing scheme with one that the labor movement and beneficiaries
will inevitably view as a reduction.
The recent huge increases in the Consumer Price Index,
combined with sluggish growth in average wages, have generated
serious proposals for cutting back on the Social Security adjust-
ment provisions that apply to current beneficiaries. Arguments
for such change include asserted defects in the CPI and a belief
that Congress did not intend for Social Security benefits to rise at
a faster pace than the earnings received by large segments of the
working population. Budgetary considerations have given impetus
to the discussion; trimming a single percent off the benefit ad-
justment scheduled for June 1980 could reduce Federal expendi-
tures by $1 billion during the ensuing fiscal year. Yet concern
about the political consequences caused both administration and
Congressional leaders to back away from such a change in
1980.187
A change in the age at which "full retirement benefits" are
paid is more likely than an overhaul or even modification of the
wage-benefit formula. In 1978, Congress amended the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act to proscribe mandatory retire-
ment before age seventy in most lines of work.' 88  Supporters of
the legislation argued forcefully for the social and economic ad-
vantages of encouraging healthy individuals to continue working
beyond sixty-five. 189 Recent proposals to roll back Social Securi-
185 See id. at 401-02.
18' For a clear statement of the arguments for price-indexing, see Hsiao, An Optimal
Indexing Method for Social Security, in FINANCING SOCIAL SECURITY 41 (C. Campbell ed.
1979).
187 See N.Y. Times, March 11, 1980, at D5, col. 2.
1 Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256,
92 Stat. 189 (1978).
189 See S. RaP. No. 493, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 2-4 (1977), reprinted in [1978) U.S, CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 504, 505-07.
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ty's "normal retirement age" have met fierce opposition,' 90 but if
the 1978 legislation leads to significantly larger numbers of work-
ers delaying Social Security benefits past age sixty-five, such a
change may someday be politically feasible.
Federal income taxation of benefits is likelier still. The pre-
sent value of Social Security benefits to the employee with high
earnings and significant supplemental retirement income from
pensions and savings depends greatly on their tax-free status. Ten
years ago, a proposal to modify that status would have been no
more than an academic daydream. Today, a recommendation
from the Social Security Advisory Council that one-half of Social
Security benefit payments be taxed must be taken seriously.
1 9 1
If these or other "deliberalizing" changes occur, will they af-
fect the plans of those near retirement? Perhaps. Recent amend-
ments have demonstrated inconsistent views on the protection of
benefit expectations, but certain patterns are evident. Insofar as
Congress protected benefits expectations in the 1977 transitional
provisions, it limited that protection to retirement benefits. Sur-
vivor and disability benefits were treated as so contingent and
uncertain as to permit abrupt change.1 92 Retirement benefits more
than five years away were also treated as too indefinite and uncer-
tain to require protection. 193 Under the 1977 amendments, those
reaching sixty-two before 1984 were given the option of receiving
benefits calculated under the old coupled formula. 194 Similarly,
they were shielded from the offsetting of public pension benefits
against Social Security spouse benefits also legislated in 1977.195
In both cases, five years was the band of protection. Those
younger than fifty-seven found their future benefits significantly
altered and in some cases substantially devalued by the amend-
ments. Furthermore, the Act's protection of worker benefit expec-
tations for those five yezfrs or less from benefits was itself incom-
plete. Those reaching the age for retired-worker benefits in 1981
190 See text at note 8 supra. Both the 1975 and 1979 Advisory Councils recommended
such a change, to take effect gradually after the turn of the century. See REPORTS OF THE
QUADRENNIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 97, at 62-63 ("recom-
mends that serious consideration be given to gradually extending the retirement age, start-
ing in the year 2005"); ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, SOCIAL SECURITY FINANC-
ING AND BENEFITS 173-78 (1979).
191 See id. at 74-76.
192 See text at notes 153-55 supra.
193 See notes 154-55 and accompanying text supra.
194 See 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(4)(B) (Supp. 1 1977).
195 See Martin, Social Security Benefits for Spouses, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 789, 814-15 (1978).
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are entitled to benefits based on the pre-1977 formula-but with-
out the automatic adjustments that formula would have provided in 1979
and 1980. They have the option to use the average monthly
earnings-benefit relationships of the old law, frozen as of De-
cember 1978.196
To summarize, past practice and current political reality
allow a fairly confident prediction that those presently receiving
benefits or immediately eligible for them will receive at least the
amounts provided under present legislation. Retirement planning
for workers five years or closer to eligibility must acknowledge a
slight possibility of legislative change reducing or devaluing pro-
jected benefits. Retirement planning for those fifty-five or
younger must proceed with the realization that, while general
formula reductions are not likely, if general reductions or more
narrowly focused deliberalizations occur, Congress may not pro-
tect such individuals' benefit expectations.
VI
THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF DECOUPLING
Social Security experts quickly lined up behind decoupling.
That alone, however, was no guarantee of Congressional action.
Numerous factors combined to permit the essentially opposition-
free passage of the new benefit formula amendment.
First, the change was presented not as a benefit reduction,
but in words such as "technical flaw," "decoupling," and "index-
ing" that calmed the public and their congressional representa-
tives. More than once proponents argued that the purpose of the
change was not to reduce benefits (although they also said decou-
pling would cut the long-term deficit in half) because the same
capricious dependence of benefits on price and wage levels which
could yield replacement rates above 100% might also yield rates
of 20% or 30%. 197 The avowed purpose of the reform was to
produce predictable and controllable replacement rates, not to re-
duce benefits. 198
196 See text at note 154 supra.
197 See, e.g., President Carter's Social Security Proposals: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on So-
cial Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1977). See also
notes 97-101 and accompanying text supra.
198 See text following note 125 supra. See also FINANCING SOCIAL SECURITY 82 (C.
Campbell ed. 1979).
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Second, the technical complexity of the proposal kept the
press, most legislators, and the public at a distance. The experts,
on the inside, testified unanimously that decoupling was neces-
sary. 1
99
Third, the proposal not only decoupled the benefit formula,
it decoupled interest groups which previously had been united de-
spite different perspectives and degrees of political cohesion. De-
coupling posed no threat at all to the group most intensely in-
terested in Social Security benefit issues, the 34 million individuals
already receiving payments. 20 ' Decoupling affected only future
benefits to be paid to present workers and their families-a
group with far less information about the system and with un-
specific expectations. Moreover, all specific legislative proposals
for decoupling dealt specially with those very close to retirement,
allowing them "grandfather" protection. 20 ' Those on whom the
change had its greatest potential impact-workers due to retire
around the turn of the century-were not a clearly delineated
199 The Chairman of the Social Insurance Committee of the American Academy of Ac-
tuaries told the House Subcommittee on Social Security in May 1977: "Decoupling is
apparently non-controversial. Everybody wants to do it. The only questions have to do with
how and to some extent with initial benefit levels." President Carter's Social Security Proposals:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, supra
note 197, at 166.
200 See Soc. SEC. BULL., Sept. 1979, Table M-3, at 37. While decoupling had no adverse
impact on the beneficiary group, one 1977 amendment did, reducing the CPI adjustment
received by early retirees. See Snee & Ross, Social Security Amendments of 1977: Legislative
History and Summary ofProvisions, Soc. SEC. BULL. Mar., 1978, at 3, 15.
The political effectiveness of present beneficiaries was confirmed in 1977 by an
amendment permitting higher earnings during retirement without reduction of benefits.
The 1977 amendments not only scheduled a drop in the age at which earnings have no
impact on benefits from 72 to 70 (effective 1982), but increased the amount a beneficiary
between 65 and 70 can receive without a Social Security payment reduction. See Social
Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, §§ 301, 302, 91 Stat. 1509.
201 See text at note 154 supra; CONSULTANT PANEL ON SOCIAL SECURITY TO THE CONGRES-
SIONAL REFERENCE SERVICE, 94TH CONG. 2r SEss., REPORT 21-22 (Joint Comm. Print 1976).
Social Security Commissioner James Cardwell, testifying in 1976 on behalf of a decoupling
bill that did not cut back on replacement rates, was asked why it should incude a ten-year
transition provision. He replied:
We assume that under the tradition of this program that it is unfair to indi-
viduals to catch them on short notice. It turns out since you can't perfect a
formula that works on averages, to guarantee automatically everybody will be
treated as under present law, as the formula intends. We know that individuals
could receive less under this formula than they would receive under existing
law. ...
The transition really says 10 years from now everybody must recognize
that the new formula is fully effective....
Decoupling the Social Security Benefit Structure: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of
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interest group. Nor could they be certain that the change would
affect them adversely. In addition, they were told that without
decoupling taxes would grow enormously.
Finally, and most important, decoupling was advanced as
early as'1975 in the context of growing public anxiety about the
adequacy of Social Security financing. Although a benefit formula
change, it was repeatedly characterized as a type of financing de-
vice, a way of meeting approximately half the long-term deficit.
As a financing device, decoupling had the attraction of requiring
no additional taxes.
The repeated stress on the need to correct an "unintended
flaw" rather than the desirability of revising an unsound, irra-
tional, and unfair benefit provision put the matter in a form
which did not place those responsible for enactment of the 1972
provision on the defensive. Congress could gracefully gather be-
hind the new decoupled formula as a suitable method of achiev-
ing what they had "intended" in 1972.202
The result was support for the revision from both political
parties. President Carter's decoupling proposal of 1977 was virtu-
ally identical to one President Ford introduced in 1976.203 The
only significant debate in Congress concerned what replacement
rate the new. stabilized system should adopt-whether the rate
should be set at the level it would reach under the old formula at
the time of transition, or be reduced.20 4 Congress eventually
chose a lower rate on the theory that it had not, in 1972, intended
"the gradual increase in replacement rates (and costs) that has oc-
curred.20 5  The 1977 Act reduced the replacement rate to ap-
proximately 5% below the level expected to prevail in January
1979 under the prior adjustment formula.206
202 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 702, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 7, reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4155, 4164 ("unintended effects"; "unintended rise in future
replacement rates").
203 See generally Decoupling the Social Security Benefit Structure: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-80 (1976).
204 The bill originally passed in the Senate had slightly higher replacement rates than
contained in the House version ultimately adopted. See H.R. REP. No. 837, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 67, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4308, 4313. The administration's
original bill had still higher replacement rates, set at the level they were expected to reach
under the old formula at the date of transition. See President Carter's Social Security Proposals:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, supra
note 197, at 12.
205 H.R. REP. No. 702, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 23, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE




Although this reduction in replacement rate, like decoupling,
was prospective only (no current beneficiaries received less be-
cause of the 1977 amendments), it represented such a sharp break
with past Congressional behavior that it suggests an important
political shift. Before 1977 Social Security politics were simple:
more was better, less inconceivable. One study called it a "classic
collective-choice situation in which a relative small number of
highly motivated voter-beneficiaries (34 million), each of whom
receives a substantial benefit, confronts a much larger number of
relatively apathetic voter-taxpayers (104 million), each of whom
bears a relatively small tax burden. Such conflicts are invariably
won by the highly motivated.1
20 7
The political situation is changing. The taxes workers now
pay (not to speak of the rates that lie ahead under the 1977
amendments) are too large to escape notice. The highly publicized
Social Security "fiscal crisis" has thrown such a spotlight on the
details of the program that taxpayer ignorance and confusion
have undoubtedly been reduced. A tug-of-war over Social Security
between the taxpayer-contributors and present and imminent
beneficiairies is inevitable as rising taxes and public attention to
the program generate greater information and organization
among contributors. Taxpayers may soon rival beneficiaries in
motivation.
The success of decoupling, doubtless the product of an un-
usual set of circumstances, suggests that future consideration of
major restructuring or resolving the program's financing difficul-
ties will no longer be limited to adjusting taxes. Numerous struc-
tural changes dismissed in the past as politically infeasible-such
as revising the effect of retirement timing on benefits, overhaul-
ing the spouse benefit system, undoing the heavy disproportion of
benefits to contribution at the bottom of the benefit scale, and
subjecting benefits to income taxation_-may now have some
chance of enactment. Retirement planners and future ben-
eficiaries must be sensitive to the possibility that the benefit system
may be altered when considering the impact of Social Security
payments on a comprehensive retirement plan. Abrupt and
dramatic change is not likely, but decoupling shows that change is
possible.
207 W. MITCHELL, THE POPULARITY OF SOCIAL SECURITY: A PARADOX IN PUBLIC CHOICE
10 (1977).
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